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Economic Rights in the United States and
International Human Rights Law:
Toward an "Entirely New Strategy"
by
BARBARA STARK*

Introduction
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights1 (ICESCR or "the Covenant") sets forth an ambitious statement
of rights which the parties accept as an affirmative obligation owed their
people. 2 By ratifying the Covenant, a government "commits itself to its
best efforts to secure for its citizens the basic standards of material exist3 Along with the International Covenant on Civil and Politence ....
* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1974, Cornell;
J.D. 1976, N.Y.U.; LL.M. 1989, Columbia. I am most grateful to Fran Ansley, Louis Henkin,
Glenn Reynolds, and Nadine Taub for their painstaking and helpful reviews of earlier drafts.
Their inspiration and encouragement, and that of Philip Alston and James C.N. Paul, are
deeply appreciated. I also acknowledge the generous support of the American Council of
Learned Societies, the American Philosophical Society, and the Faculty Development Program of the University of Tennessee, and the invaluable assistance of Rahul Kale of the U.N.
Center for Human Rights (New York); Alexandre Tikhonov, Secretary of the Committee for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Geneva); and Lars Ludvigsen, U.N. Centre For
Human Settlements (Habitat, Geneva). William Bright, Micki Fox, Stacey Nordquist, Ren6
Voigtlaender, and Mark Cizek provided able research assistance.
1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. See also G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (UN Resolution adopting the Covenant).
2. In addition to adequate standards of living, physical and mental health, education,
and cultural life, these include rights to self-determination, work, unionization, and social security. ICESCR, supra note 1, arts. 11-13, 15, 1, 6, 8, 9. See also infra text accompanying
notes 51-52.
3. President CarterSigns Covenants on Human Rights, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct. 31, 1977,
586, 587 [hereinafter OcT. 31 BULLETIN] (President Carter's interpretation of the obligation);
cf ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 2(1).
See generally The Limburg Principleson the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex (1987), reprinted in Symposium, The Implementation of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social
and CulturalRights, 9 HUM. RTs. Q. 121 (1987) [hereinafter Limburg Principles](considering
the obligations of state parties to the ICESCR). In 1986, a group of distinguished experts in
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ical Rights 4 (ICCPR or "the Civil Covenant"), it is globally recognized
as the definitive statement of international human rights law. 5 Although
some commentators claim American origins for ICESCR,6 tracing it to
the "freedom from want" described by President Franklin Roosevelt in
his "Four Freedoms" speech, 7 and it has been before the Senate since
1978, the United States is the only major industrialized democracy that
8
has not yet ratified the Covenant.
international law synthesized the Limburg Principles, which they agreed "reflect the present
state of international law unless specifically qualified as a 'recommendation.' " Id. at 121.
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See also G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at
52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (UN Resolution adopting the Civil Covenant). For essays on
civil and political rights, see THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

(Louis Henkin ed., 1981).

5. See Limburg Principles, supra note 3, at 123 ("[T]hese instruments constitute the
International Bill of Human Rights."); Louis Henkin, The Internationalization of Human
Rights, reprintedin Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
981, 983 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW] ("The Universal
Declaration has achieved universal recognition, and the two principal international covenants
[ICCPR and ICESCR] have now come into effect."). The two Covenants develop principles
first set forth in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Limburg Principles, supra note 3, at 123. The
Universal Declaration, however, "is not in terms a treaty instrument." U.N. Secretary-General, 1971 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW at 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/245. The "conventional wisdom" is that two covenants evolved from the Declaration "because of the East-West
split and a disagreement over the value of socioeconomic rights." David P. Forsythe, Book
Review, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 540, 540 (1986) (reviewing A. GLENN MOWER, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE:

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC/

SOCIAL RIGHTS (1985)). Professor Harris attributed the division to differences in "the nature
of the legal obligations and the systems of supervision that could be imposed." D.J. HARRIS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 (4th ed. 1991). There have been efforts to link, if not reunite, the Covenants. See infra note 9.
6. This is "our common usurpation for the inhabitants of the United States," as noted
by Louis Henkin in THE AGE OF RIGHTS at x (1990) [hereinafter HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS].
7. Eighth Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, at 2855, 2860 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1966). In his
1944 State of the Union Message, Roosevelt eloquently elaborated on the substance of "freedom from want": "[t]he right to a useful and remunerative job... [t]he right to earn enough to
provide adequate food and clothing and recreation; ... [t]he right of every family to a decent
home ... [t]he right to adequate medical care ... [t]he right to adequate protection from the
economic fears of old age, sickness, accident, and unemployment; the right to a good education." Eleventh Annual Message to Congress (Jan. 11, 1944), in 3 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1790-1966, supra at 2875, 2881. See also Louis B. Sohn, The
New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.
L. REV. 1, 33-35 (1982) (discussing the significance of Roosevelt's eighth and eleventh
messages to Congress); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 36, 63 (1990) (same).
8. One hundred and four nations had ratified or acceded to the Covenant as of December 13, 1991. Committee on Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Report on the Sixth Session,
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Two basic reasons are usually given for our nonadherence. First, it
has been suggested that the rights set forth in the Covenant are "foreign"
to our notion of rights. It has been argued that the Covenant represents
aspirations, as distinguished from "real," enforceable, civil or political
rights. 9 During the Cold War, the U.S. Department of State viewed
ICESCR as a socialist manifesto thinly veiled in the language of rights. 10
U.N. ESCOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 8, at 2, 103-12, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, E/C.12/1991/4
(1992). But see Morris B. Abram, Human Rights and the United Nations: Pastas Prologue,4
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 69, 71 (1991) (deploring ratification by countries with "neither the intention nor the desire to abide by them"). See generally Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN
TODAY 106 (1978) [hereinafter HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY] (arguing for wider
acceptance of and compliance with human rights norms, through greater adherence to, and
greater respect for, human rights instruments).
9.

See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 352

(1991). See generally Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in InternationalHuman
Rights: Reflections on InstitutionalOrder, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754, 756-57 (1982). Much has
been written about the questionable distinction between "positive" and "negative" rights. See,
e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 864
(1986). For present purposes, "positive rights" refer to explicitly positive rights, as opposed to
those implicitly derived from a negative right, such as the government's obligation not to prohibit abortion.
In international law, the dichotomy between positive and negative rights resonates in the
early arguments between the proponents of the Economic Covenant and those insisting on the
primacy of ICCPR. The drafters of the Economic Covenant maintained that political and civil
rights could not be effectively exercised unless the basic needs of survival were met. The interdependence of the two Covenants, and the fallacy of asserting the superiority of either, is now
well established. See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social Cultural Civil
and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N.
Doc. A/Res/44/130 (1989) (accepted Dec. 15, 1989); see also Melanie Beth Oliviero, Human
Needs and Human Rights: Which Are More Fundamental?,40 EMORY L.J. 911, 915-16
(1991). But see Michael W. Giles, Comments on Human Needs and Human Rights: Which
Are More Fundamental?,40 EMORY L.J. 939, 942 (1991). See generally Russel Lawrence
Barsh, Current Developments: 4 Special Session of the UN General Assembly Rethinks the
Economic Rights and Duties of States, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 199 (1991) (noting a recent
"linkage of human rights with the conditions for capitalism").
For an overview on commonly drawn distinctions between civil and political rights and
economic, social, and cultural rights, see Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope
of States Parties'Obligations Under the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 159-60 (1987) [hereinafter Alston & Quinn, The Nature and
Scope of Parties'Obligations].
10. Paula Dobriansky, U.S. Human Rights Policy: An Overview, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
CURRENT POL'Y No. 1091, at 2-3 (1988); Richard Schifter, U.S.-Soviet Quality of Life: A
Comparison, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POL'Y No. 713, at 1 (1985), reprinted in NEwMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 7, at 388. As Diane Orentlicher has noted, "by the 1950s,
U.S. reservations about adherence to human rights treaties had ripened into outright hostility." Diane F. Orentlicher, The Power of an Idea: The Impact of United States Human Rights
Policy, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 43, 46-47 (1991).
Part of the government's antipathy toward economic rights reflected an arguably wellfounded defensiveness. The United States was wary of being held to a more rigorous standard
than less affluent countries. As Professor Thomas Franck has observed, the United Nations
has employed a double standard with respect to human rights. Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats
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It is settled that such rights are not protected under the U.S.
Constitution. II
Second, political leaders have maintained that the concerns addressed by ICESCR are within the exclusive authority of the states, 12 and
that national adoption would infringe on state sovereignty. 13 The
Supreme Court and most scholars reject the notion that the federal government must defer to the states on social welfare issues as a matter of
law,14 pointing to the New Deal, Medicaid, Social Security, and volumiand Camels: Is There a Double Standardat the United Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 81925 (1984).
11. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318, 323, 326-27 (1980) (finding that indigent
women have no constitutional right to federal or state funding for medically necessary abortions); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (finding no constitutional guarantee to
adequate housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970) (finding that maximum grant regulation, creating a cap on welfare benefits to large families, did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment). As Henkin has noted, the emergence in the twentieth century of
what some have characterized as a welfare state has been accomplished despite the Constitution, rather than because of it. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 122. See also
Lynn A. Baker, The Myth of the American Welfare State, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 110(1991)
(reviewing THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:
PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES

(1990)); Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of

Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695; William H. Clune III,
The Supreme Court's Treatment of Wealth DiscriminationsUnder the FourteenthAmendment,
1975 Sup. CT. REV. 289. But see Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 TermForeword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1969) [hereinafter Michelman, Protecting the Poor]; Charles L. Black, Further Reflections on
the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV.1103, 1105 (1986) (discussing "the
derivation of a constitutional right to a decent material basis for life"). Michelman's arguments are not likely to be embraced by the federal judiciary any time soon. See BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE

NEW

RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION:

TURNING BACK THE LEGAL

(1990); Timothy B. Tomasi & Jess A. Velona, Note, All the President'sMen? A Study
of Ronald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 766
(1987); cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988)
(comparing President Reagan's approach to Supreme Court appointments to that of Franklin
Roosevelt).
12. In international law, "state" is commonly used to refer to a nation. To avoid confusion, "state" will be used in this Article to refer only to a constituent unit of a federal nation.
An exception will be made only when "state" is part of a quotation in which it clearly refers to
a nation, such as the cited text of Article 11 of ICESCR. See infra text accompanying notes
51-53.
13. President Carter urged the adoption of a reservation recognizing state sovereignty.
Transmittal Letter, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978) (referring to Letter of
CLOCK

Submittal, Dep't of State, Dec. 17, 1977, reprinted in U.S.

RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN

88, 96 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981)
[hereinafter U.S. RATIFICATION]). The ICCPR has in fact been ratified subject to an understanding of the same import. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the ICCPR,
31 I.L.M. 645, 652 (1992).
14. See, e.g., Bums H. Weston, U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: With or Without Qualifications, in U.S. RATIFICATION.
supra note 13, at 27, 32 [hereinafter Weston, U.S. Ratification of ICESCR] ("this proposed
RIGHTS TREATIES:

WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS?
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nous legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause.15 Politically, however, neither the federal government nor the states want the federal
government to assume responsibility for-or authority over-social wel16
fare issues.
In 1990, a refreshing and original analysis appeared in the American
Journal of InternationalLaw. In U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New
Strategy,17 Professor Philip Alston criticized some of ICESCR's U.S.
proponents for effectively failing to counter either of the arguments
against ratification. First, Alston found that rather than addressing
ICESCR's "foreignness," these proponents sought to "portray the Covenant as though it did not differ significantly"' 18 from treaties dealing with
the familiar "negative" civil and political rights. 19 Second, Alston was
critical of ICESCR's erstwhile supporters for suggesting that ratification
would impose minimal obligations, 2 0 that it would "not oblige us really
to do anything," 21 rather than grappling with the real difficulties of imstates' rights reservation constitutes a legal/historical anachronism"); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (rejecting the notion that specific areas of competence are reserved to the states); Arthur Rovine & Jack Goldklang, Defense of Declarations,
Reservations and Understandings, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 13, at 54; cf. Torture
Convention Transmittal Package, U.S. Dep't of State, Action Memorandum, dated May 6,
1988, at 5 (federal-state reservation).
15. See BASIL RAUCH, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933-38 (1944); CHARLES A.
& MARY R. BEARD, AMERICA IN MIDPASSAGE (1939); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); RICHARD HOFSTADTER,

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 311-47 (1948); 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1988) (Social

Security); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988) (Medicaid); supra note 7.
In April 1992, legislation was introduced to create a new Works Progress Administration.
Jason DeParle, Nostalgia and Need Conjure Up Thoughts of the WP.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1992, § 4, at 6.
16. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text. But cf.Jonathan R. Macey, Federal
Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a PublicChoiceExplanation ofFederalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265 (1990) (Congress delegates to the states
when-and only when-it receives more political support for doing so than it would were it to
retain the regulatory authority delegated).
17. Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365 (1990) [hereinafter
Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy].
18. Id. at 366.
19. These would include ICCPR, supra note 4, Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp.
No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2106,
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), openedfor signature
March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). On the distinction between
positive and negative rights, see supra note 9.
20. See Alston, Need for an EntirelyNew Strategy, supra note 17, at 366.
21. Id. at 378-79. As described infra Part II.B, I agree with Professor Alston that the
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plementation, including those posed by state sovereignty. After exposing the flaws in both positions, Professor Alston urged those seeking
ratification to develop "an entirely new strategy."
There has never been a better time to do so. We 22 are rethinking our
Cold War aversion to "economic rights" for three major reasons. First,
in light of the Soviet empire's collapse 23 and what has been called the
"end of history,"' 24 detractors can no longer link economic rights with
Soviet sympathies. Domestic welfare advocacy, similarly, can no longer
be attributed to "foreign" influence. 25 Second, economic rights are a
United States would incur substantial obligations. The question is whether the costs are outweighed by the benefits and how (and by whom) this is calculated. For a discussion of the
difficulties and the limitations of this kind of approach, see Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit
Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). In addition to the
cost of actual compliance, the United States would incur some administrative costs. There is
no extra cost to the parties for the expenses of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which are absorbed in the regular U.N. budget. Interview with Alexandre
Tikhonov, Secretary to the Committee, U.N. Centre for Human Rights, in Palais des Nations,
Geneva (June 11, 1991) [hereinafter Tikhonov Interview]. For a description of the Committee,
see infra note 47. This policy might be reconsidered if the United States were to ratify and
each of the fifty states was to submit its own report. See infra note 142.
22. A rich and growing body of scholarship explores Martha Minow's recurring problem:
"A difficulty here, as always, is who is 'we.'" Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986
Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15 (1987); see also Judith Resnick, Complex Feminist Conversations, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7.
A telling variation appears in the literature on economic rights. As Jeffrey Swanson
points out in his review of PETER H. Rossi, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF
HOMELESSNESS (1989), the book is "address[ed] to an audience that excludes the poor and
homeless." 5 MED. HUM. REV. 50, 55 (1991). Swanson criticizes Rossi for referring to "we,"
his audience, who can rescue "them," the poor. In this Article, "we" is all of us in this country, women and men, people of color and whites, many of whom are (or have been or will be)
poor.
23. See Francis X. Clines, Gorbachev, Last Soviet Leader Resigns; U.S. Recognizes Republics' Independence: Communist Flag is Removed; Yeltsin Gets Nuclear Controls, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1991, at Al; Serge Schmemann, The Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 1991, at Al; Serge Schmemann, DeclaringDeath of Soviet Union, Russia and 2 Republics Form New Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at Al. For a thoughtful analysis, see Seweryn Bialer, The Death ofSoviet Communism, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1991-1992, at
166. See generally Graham Allison & Robert Blackwill, America's Stake in the Soviet Future,
FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1991, at 77; ROBERT CULLEN, TWILIGHT OF EMPIRE: INSIDE THE
CRUMBLING SOVIET BLOC (1991); VLADISLAV KRASNOV, RUSSIA BEYOND COMMUNISM
(1991).
24. See Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory?, NAT'L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3, 4
("[T]he endpoint of man's ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal
democracy as the final form of human government."); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF
HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS:
PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CAPITALISM (1991); Thomas L. Friedman,

Peace Now? There's a New Era. Then There's the Mideast, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991, § 4, at
I ("The progress in East-West relations in the last five years... all derived from a single fact:
the triumph of capitalism over communism.").
25. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the extent to which such attribution
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growing concern 26 to the increasing numbers of poor Americans. 27
Third, other recent developments, including the economic unification of
Europe 28 and the unprecedented Gulf War coalition, 29 signal a sea
change in international law. The United States is becoming more involved in international organizations, 30 and more concerned about its
was ever credible, except to note that there were surely times when the charge was leveled
wrongly, and times when it was made in good faith, and too often these times were the same.
Cf Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 366 (noting the suspicion of
many Americans, who view the ICESCR as "Covenant on Uneconomic, Socialist and Collective Rights"); Stephen Haggard, Markets, Poverty Alleviation, and Income Distribution: An
Assessment of Neoliberal Claims, 5 ETHICS & INT'L AFl'. 175, 176 (1991) (arguing that in the
1980s, unlike previous periods of economic crises, "socialist ... alternatives to economic management were politically and intellectually discredited").

26.

See

THEODORE R.

MARMOR ET AL.,

AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD

WELFARE

STATE: PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES 47, 48 (1990) (noting widespread public
support for the Medicare, Food Stamp, and Social Security programs); KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE
POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN

AFTERMATH (1990) (arguing that the widening gap between rich and poor, along with greater
concentration of wealth, is likely to lead, as it did in the 1930s, to a resurgence of populism).
27. See Jason DeParle, Number of People in Poverty Shows Sharp Rise in US., N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at Al; Peter Passel,America's Position in the Economic Race: What the
Numbers Show and Conceal, N.Y. TIMES, March 4, 1990, § 4, at 4; The Poorest Americans,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at A14; see also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, WHEN THE BOUGH
BREAKS: THE COST OF NEGLECTING OUR CHILDREN (1991) (second in the world in per
capita income, the United States "does not even make it into the top ten on any significant
indicator of child welfare"). But see Robert Pear, U.S. Reports Poverty Is down But inequality
Is up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1990, at A14. See generally MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE NEW
AMERICAN POVERTY (1984) (discussing the impact of the internationalized economy on the
poor in America).
In the aftermath of the Los Angeles riots, commentators pointed out the terrible urgency
of these concerns, and that the problems of the inner-city poor affect all of society. Timothy
Noah & David Wessel, Urban Solutions: Inner City Remedies Offer Plans--andHope, Experts
Say, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1992, at Al; Routine Wastelands, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1992, § 4, at
16 (editorial).
28. See, eg., John Temple Lang, The Development of European Community ConstitutionalLaw, 25 INT'L LAW. 455 (1991); Alan Riding, EuropeansAgree on a Pact ForgingNew
Political Ties and IntegratingEconomies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at Al. See generally
ALPO M. RusI, AFTER THE COLD WAR: EUROPE'S NEW POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE (1991);
JOHN PINDER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE BUILDING OF A UNION (1991); Gregory F.

Treverton, The New Europe, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1991-1992, at 94.
29. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland
Foreign Relations Law; UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 'The Old OrderChangeth,'85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63 (1991); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, New World Orderor Hollow Victory?, FOREIGN AFF.,
Fall 1991, at 53, 54 ("For once the concept of collective security as envisioned in the U.N.
charter worked."); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L
L. 452 (1991) (authoritative analysis of Charter provisions involved in Security Council decisions); see also IraqiSymposium-The Iraqi Crisis: Legal and Socio-EconomicDimensions, 15
S. ILL. U. L.J. 411 (1991).
30. In 1990, Congress approved full payment of 1990 U.N. dues, plus a 20% downpayment on accumulated arrearage. Steven A. Dimoff, US.-U.N. Funding Update, INTER DEPENDENT, June-July 1991, at 4; see Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The United States Commitment to
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credibility in the international community. 3 1 We are in the process of
shaping a new leadership role for ourselves that transcends that of
"world policeman." This includes a renewed and expanded commitment
to international human rights. 32 On April 2, 1992, after fourteen years in
committee, 33 the Civil Covenant was ratified by the United States Senate.34 While it would be premature to predict ratification of ICESCR
(the "other half' of the "International Bill of Rights"), the possibility
the Norms of the United Nations and Its Related Agencies, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 125 (1991).
Renewed participation in international organs has similarly been the subject of recent
scholarship. See Richard B. Bilder, The United States and the World Court in the Post- "Cold
War" Era, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 251, 257-63 (1991) (advocating U.S. support of the International Court of Justice); Robert E. Lutz, Perspectives on the World Court, the United States,
and International Dispute Resolution in a Changing World, 25 INT'L LAW. 675, 686-704
(1991) (describing strategies on reforming the world court and revising the United States' approach to it).
31. Cf DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990); Phillip R.
Trimble, InternationalLaw, Foreign Policy and the Reagan Years, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1041,
1043 (1991) (book review) ("The main point of Moynihan's approach is that international law,
often associated with fuzzy idealism, is practically important, and the time is now ripe to put
elements of Wilsonian idealism into practice."). It has been suggested that the United States
may have major image problems. E.g., Edward S. Herman, The United States Versus Human
Rights in the Third World, 4 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 85 (1991) (arguing that the United States
has repeatedly failed to uphold human rights in the Third World).
It has also been suggested, somewhat cynically, that the United States is more interested
in the United Nations because there is no longer any effective opposition to the United States
there. Ian Williams, Why the Right Loves the U.N., 254 NATION 478 (Apr. 13, 1992).
32. Letter from President George Bush, 31 I.L.M. 660 (1992) (stating that "ratification
would . . .strengthen our ability to influence the development of appropriate human rights
principles"); see also Jimmy Carter, The United States and the Advancement of Human Rights
Around the World, 40 EMORY L.J. 723 (1991). This necessarily implies a commitment to the
values that shape international human rights, particularly a deep respect for human dignity.
See MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 367-448
(1980) (describing past trends in international human rights). But cf Richard A. Epstein, No
New Property, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 747, 775 (1990) [hereinafter Epstein, No New Property]
(insisting that "the relevant inquiry is always how to maximize human dignity under conditions of scarcity").
33. For a discussion of the background, see 31 I.L.M. 648, 649 (1992).
34. Text of the Resolution of Ratification, 31 I.L.M. 658 (1992). While ratification received scant mass media coverage, it was hailed in the human rights community as a great
breakthrough. The preratification hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on November 21, 1991 was described as "the first significant investment of effort on the part of
a U.S. administration in more than a decade" regarding any of the four major human rights
treaties submitted to the Senate by President Carter. ASIL NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at
1.
While ratification represents a major step forward, it must be understood in historical and
political context as part of an ongoing tradition of domestic implementation of human fights
precepts. For a comprehensive and scholarly survey, see Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights:
The Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in
Domestic Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989).

November 1992]

ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

has never been more real. Indeed, the United States participated in the
Copenhagen Conference on the Human Dimension in 1990, 35 and in No-

vember 1990 signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 36 expressly
affirming in an international instrument that "everyone... has the right
37
to enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights."
...
This Article suggests a new strategy to capitalize on these developments, which make the Covenant a timely and pertinent subject for politicians, 38 public interest groups,3 9 those lawyers already citing the
35. For the text of the agreement resulting from the conference, see Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Conference
on Security and Co-operation in Europe), 29 I.L.M. 1306 (1991) [hereinafter Human
Dimension].
36. For the text of the agreement, see Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990,
30 I.L.M. 193 (1991).
37. Id. at 194. The United States signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948. It refers to economic rights, but it was not binding, being neither custom nor treaty
when signed. See supra note 5. As Professor Alston has pointed out, in 1989 the United States
signed the Vienna Declaration, which expressed a similar acceptance of economic and social
rights. See Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 365.
These agreements are generally regarded as political, as distinguished from legal, commitments. Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Human Rights Law in Soviet and American
Courts, 100 YALE L.J. 2315, 2319 (1991). In international law, however, this distinction is
frequently blurred. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 644 (1991) ("The distinction between law and politics, so central to the
preservation of the neutrality and objectivity of law in the domestic sphere, does not have quite
the same force in international law."). But see Alan Tonelson, What is the NationalInterest?,
ATLANTIC, July 1991, at 35, 37 ("[I]nternationalism ... has led directly to the primacy of
foreign policy in American life and to the neglect of domestic problems."). See generally
Thomas J. Ehr, After 40 Years, Let's Ratify U.N. Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1989, at
El0; Paul Savoy, Time for a Second Bill of Rights, NATION 797 (June 17, 1991) (advocating
the adoption of an economic Bill of Rights).
38. Ratification of ICESCR may well represent a major political coup for the political
party able to take credit for it. The Republicans could claim to have enacted a domestic
program, while leaving basic responsibility with the states. Cf Adam Clymer, PoliticiansTake
Up Domestic Issues: Polls Suggest Why, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1991, § 4, at 5. R.W. Apple,
Jr., Majority in Poll Fault Focus by Bush on Global Policy but Back New Order, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1991, at A8.
The Democrats could show that they can function in an international context and that
they are sensitive to charges of "big government" and demands for local control. See, e.g.,
Adam Clymer, Democrats Find Potent Issue: ExtendingBenefits to Jobless, N.Y. TIMES, July
31, 1991, at Al. See generally Robert D. Hormats, The Roots of American Power, FOREIGN
AlE., Summer 1991, at 132, 138 (discussing the impact that domestic policy decisions have on
United States foreign policy).
39. As Alston has astutely pointed out,
In the U.S. context, the best prospects seem to lie in convincing other groups, such as
those dealing with issues like women's rights, homelessness, child abuse, malnutrition and access to education, that their concerns might usefully be pursued under the
rubric of economic, social and cultural rights, and that ratification of the Covenant
would be a productive step in that direction.
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Covenant in state courts, 4° and those urging a more active U.S. role in
international human rights. 41 It proposes that the United States ratify
ICESCR and delegate implementation to the states, at least in the first
instance. 42 The first Part of this Article focuses on the critique of ecoAlston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 392.
The need for a new approach to these issues, like that offered by ICESCR, has already
been recognized by some of these groups' more farsighted advocates. Professor Mary Becker,
for example, has already called for "some entirely new standard of review for economic legislation," besides the traditional rights analysis framework, to assure that women receive their
"share of the economic pie." Mary E. Becker, Politics,Differences and Economic Rights, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169, 171.
The Covenant is similarly generating intense discussion among domestic legal scholars.
The theme of the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools was "Ensuring
Social and Economic Justice in a Changing America: Time for a New Bill of Rights?" in
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS: 1992 ANNUAL MEETING (1992) (program for
plenary session, Jan. 6, 1992). Law professors seemed genuinely surprised when their colleagues in international law informed them that an Economic "Bill of Rights" had already
been written. This is understandable since U.S. scholarship on the Economic Covenant is
"meager at best" and there is only one book on the subject in English. Alston, Need for an
Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 388. That book is A. Glenn Mower, Jr.'s INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC/SOCIAL RIGHTS (1985).
40. See Stephen Rosenbaum, Lawyers Pro Bono Publico: Using International Human
Rights Law on Behalfof the Poor, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 109, 137 (Ellen L.
Lutz et al. eds., 1989).
41. See, e.g., Gabriel M. Wilner, The Process of and Obstacles to United States Ratification of Human Rights Instruments, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 (1990); Louis B. Sohn,
Improving the Image of the United States in InternationalHuman Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
319 (1988) (editorial comment); Barbara Stark, NurturingRights: An Essay on Women, Peace,
and InternationalHuman Rights, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 144 (1991) [hereinafter Stark, Nurturing Rights]; see also Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 153, 154 (1978) (suggesting U.S. courts
give greater weight to international law in human rights litigation).
42. The United States would remain ultimately responsible for compliance under the customary international law of treaties. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May
23, 1969, art. 46, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 343, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the State Department
recognizes it as customary international law and therefore binding. BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (1991); see also France v. United States, 1952 I.C.J.
176; HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 137-39; Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). See
generally Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 286, 298 (1988) (Convention largely represents a restatement of customary rules).
For a description of the proposed framework for implementing ICESCR in the states, see
infra Part II.A. While I have little doubt that the resultant obligation could legally be foisted
upon the states under contemporary principles of federalism-and it may be necessary to impose it on some obdurate states-ratification should be understood as something being donefor
the states, rather than to them. Inducements, including assurances of autonomy and technical
support, should be sufficient. Monetary incentives could also be very persuasive. Adherence
to ICESCR must be understood as a tool to help the states provide for the welfare of their
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nomic rights as "foreign" to U.S. conceptions of rights. It shows that
while economic rights are in fact quite different from "negative" rights,
they are well-entrenched on the state level. Moreover, it argues that conceptions of economic rights under ICESCR and state constitutions are
not only fundamentally compatible, but complementary.
The second Part of the Article outlines a plan for functionally implementing ICESCR. 43 It describes the ICESCR compliance mechanisms and shows how they would function in the American system. It
then considers how ICESCR's norms would interact with existing domestic economic rights jurisprudence. I emphatically agree with Professor Alston that ratification "entail[s] the acceptance of certain
obligations." 44 I would argue further, however, that once "subjected to
the scrutiny they deserve,"' 45 these obligations would be embraced not
only by the Covenant's "natural constituenc[ies]," 46 but by beleaguered
state governments as well. Finally, the second Part considers some of the
likely consequences of adoption and implementation, for both the United
States and the international community.
As part of ICESCR compliance, ratifying nations prepare self-monitoring reports that document their efforts, successes, and failures to "progressively achieve" the goals set out in ICESCR. These "country
reports" are reviewed by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the "Committee"). 47 This Article derives conceptions of
citizens, a task that they have in fact already assumed under their own constitutions and the
"New Federalism." See infra Part I.A; The Governors and the Poor, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,
1991, at A16 (editorial) (describing budget crises affecting majority of states, attributable in
large part to rise in "caseloads and spending... in all the major open-ended programs for the
poor").
It should be noted that this proposal only addresses the allocation of responsibility between state and federal governments. It does not systematically consider allocation among the
three branches (executive, legislative, and judicial) of each government system. See infra text
accompanying notes 107-111.

43. The development here, from conceptual to functional aspects of ratification, draws on
Professor Henkin's description of the "movement in international law from 'conceptualism' to
'functionalism,' from logical deduction from abstract principles to pragmatic attention to practical needs." Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values and Functions,216 RECUEIL
DES COURS D' ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 1, 19 (1989).
44. Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 368.

45.

Id.

46. Id. at 366 (Alston states that the "human rights community ... is incorrectly...
assumed to be [ICESCR's] natural constituency.").
47. The Committee consists of eighteen recognized experts in the field of human rights
elected for a term of four years by the Economic and Social Council, from a list of persons
nominated by the parties to the Covenant. E.S.C. Res. 1985/17, U.N. Economic and Social
Council (1985), reprinted in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING UNDER SIX MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 71, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/1, U.N. Sales
No. E.91.XIV.1 (1991) [hereinafter MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS].
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economic rights under the Covenant, as well as their practical application, primarily from recent self-monitoring reports of the western industrialized countries 48 that have ratified ICESCR, and the first five
published reports of the Committee. 49 Domestic conceptions of economic rights will be derived primarily from state constitutional texts and
recent decisions of states' high courts.50
This Article does not purport to analyze all of the state constitutions, nor does it consider all of the provisions of the Covenant. It is a
preliminary exploration, not a full-scale study, which I hope will show
the need for deeper and broader inquiry. 5 1 It is basically limited to Article 11, paragraph 1, which provides "The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing, and
48. The focus here is on western industrialized democracies that are similar enough to
ours--economically, socially and politically-to invite productive comparison. Sawyer, The
Western Conception of Law, excerpted in MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LEGAL TRADITIONS 26 (1985). See also Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Describing and Implementing
Universal Human Rights, 26 TEx. INT'L L.J. 189, 192 (1991) (reviewing JACK DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989)).

49. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the First Session,
U.N. ESCOR, 1987, Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. E/1987/28, E/C.12/1987/5 (1985) [hereinafter
First Session Report]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Second Session, U.N. ESCOR, 1988, Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/1988/14, E/C.12/1988/4 (1988)
[hereinafter Second Session Report]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Third Session, U.N. ESCOR, 1989, Supp. No. 4, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, E/C.12/
1989/5 (1985) [hereinafter Third Session Report]; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Fourth Session, U.N. ESCOR, 1990, Supp. No. 8, at 79-94, U.N.
Doc. E/1990/28, E/C.12/1990/3 (1990) [hereinafter Fourth Session Report]; Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Report on the Fifth Session, U.N. ESCOR, 1991, Supp.
No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, E/C.12/1990/8 (1991), reprinted in MANUAL ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 47 [hereinafter Fifth Session Report].
50. The focus on governmental, as opposed to popular, conceptions can be defended on at
least two grounds. First, international law remains essentially the law of nations. Nationsnot their "people"-are the parties to the Covenant regime. Second, since this Article deals
primarily with western democracies, there is presumably some rough correlation between the
conceptions of governments and those of their "people." See James Gray Pope, Republican
Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American ConstitutionalOrder, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 287 (1990). See generally Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking About the Individual
in InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 11 (1978).
I focus on state constitutions and the judicial decisions interpreting them even though
legislation and administrative enactments would also be taken into account under ICESCR.
State constitutions provide the closest domestic analog, structurally and substantively, to the
Covenant. See infra text accompanying notes 57-104.
51. By "inquiry" I mean not only academic research but a public process, which would
include widespread dissemination of ICESCR and discussion as well as review and assessment
of empirical data. This could contribute to and build on the "republican revival" described by
Professors Cass Sunstein, Frank Michelman, and others. See infra note 101.
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housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. '5 2
The focus is on Article 11 because for the majority of Americans it is
probably the most important and, not coincidentally, the most
53
contentious.
I.

Comparison of the General Conceptions of Economic Rights
Under ICESCR and State Constitutions

The federal government naturally comes to mind when we think of
the United States in an international context. Under the Constitution,
the federal government determines foreign policy. 54 It establishes our
image, the public mask we present to the rest of the world. The federal
government under the Reagan and Bush administrations has emphasized
its hostility toward economic rights, at least until very recently. 5 This
must be understood in the context of the Cold War, during which "economic rights" were often linked with the Soviet bloc, at least by our De56
partment of State.
In the domestic context, however, economic rights have always been
at the heart of our state jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the public mask
assumed for purposes of foreign policy, we have historically accepted the
idea of economic rights on the domestic state level. The "New Federalism" returned substantial welfare responsibilities, assumed by the federal
government in response to the Depression, to the states. 57 Our rejection
of economic rights on the federal level is not only consistent with, but
arguably necessitates, our support of those rights on the state level. In52. ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 1.
53. See supra text accompanying note 25; infra notes 76 and 87 and accompanying text.
While I hope this Article is of some use to scholars focusing on different clusters of rights, the
questions raised by domestic recognition of other ICESCR rights---"cultural rights," for exampie-may well require a different analytic framework. See, eg., Stephen Marks, UNESCO and
Human Rights: The Implementation of Rights Relating to Education, Science, Culture, and
Communication, 13 TEx. INT'L L.J. 35 (1977).
54. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
55. See supra notes 10, 33-38 and accompanying text.
56. Dobriansky, supra note 10; see also Alston, Needfor an EntirelyNew Strategy, supra
note 17, at 375; supra note 25.
57. See infra Part I.A.2. The linkage to be established here, between state constitutional
jurisprudence and economic rights, may be profitably compared with the already well-established linkage between federal constitutional jurisprudence and civil and political rights. See,
e.g., Richard B. Lillich, The Constitutionand InternationalHuman Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
851, 852-53 (1989); Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, Linkages Between International
Human Rights and U.S. ConstitutionalLaw,79 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1985); HURST HANNUM,
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1
(1985); see also Robert J. Martineau, Jr., Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of Interna-

tionalHuman Rights Norms, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 87 (1983).
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deed, skipping over the federal apparatus, we find core structural and
substantive similarities between the Covenant and state constitutions.
These similarities result in surprisingly similar conceptions of "public
58
welfare."
A.

The Notion of Public Entitlement in the States

1. State Constitutional Traditions

State governments have historically been the repositories of the police power. The original colonies assumed responsibility for the welfare
of their inhabitants, in part because they had little choice. Colonial constitutions reflected "practices developed during decades of neglect under
an antiquated and poorly functioning imperial system."' 59 The earliest
form of public welfare in the Puritan colonies was based on the concept
of religious community. There was a shared sense of a moral responsibility toward each other that went beyond contemporary notions of charity. 60

John Locke's social contract supplied the theoretical foundation

for other economic rights, such as public education and services to pro58. The terms "public welfare," "economic rights," "entitlements," and "social welfare"
will be used interchangeably to refer broadly to rights that are essentially "positive," arising
out of a recognized affirmative obligation on the part of the state to provide benefits, such as
affordable housing. The lack of consistent nomenclature reflects the use by the states and the
parties to ICESCR of a variety of terms to refer to the same concept, as well as the use of the
same term to refer to somewhat different concepts.
The emphasis here is on functional, rather than theoretical or ideological, conceptions. In
practical political terms, for example, the distinction between "communitarian" and "liberal"
is often blurred. Social democracies, as well as liberal democracies, draw on both philosophies.
See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (1990); Note, How Communal are Reasonable People?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1943 (1991) (reviewing MACEDO, supra); Adamantia Pollis, Liberal,
Socialist, and Third World Perspectives of Human Rights, in TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS

1 (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis eds., 1982). For an authoritative clarification of the theoretical distinction between "communitarian" and "liberal," see MICHAEL J.
FRAMEWORK

SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).

59. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING at xiii (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES]. See also WILLI P. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1980).
Professor A.E. Dick Howard's article, The Renaissance of State ConstitutionalLaw, I
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. LAW 1 (1988) [hereinafter Howard, Renaissance of State Constitutional Law], is one of the best and most cogent introductions to state constitutional law.
For a guide to the voluminous and burgeoning literature on state constitutions, see State ConstitutionalLaw Resources, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317, 317-375

(Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985).
60. THE AMERICAN PURITANS (Perry Miller ed., 1956). In Puritan Massachusetts, for
example, John Winthrop summoned the man who had been stealing from his woodpile. Winthrop told the thief to take what he needed for the rest of the winter, saving him not only from
the cold, but from sin. Id.
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mote public health. 61 Through their constitutions states assumed-in varying degrees and with varying success-responsibility for the general
welfare of their populations. 62 The Virginia Constitution, for example,
required government to be "instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the people" and to establish "an effective system of
education. '63 The Massachusetts Constitution similarly mandated that
"the legislature ought frequently to assemble ... as the common good
may require." 64 Whether explicitly addressed in text, or subsumed in the
phrase "general welfare," the concept of public entitlement was part of
state constitutional jurisprudence from its inception.
61. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 46, 47, 88. See generally Jackson
Turner Main, The American States in the Revolutionary Era, in SOVEREIGN STATES IN AN
AGE OF UNCERTAINTY I (Ronald A. Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1981) (describing record
of American states during Revolutionary era with respect to economic affairs and social
change).
62. See STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (Robert F. Williams
ed., 1988) (reviewing state constitutional protection of individual liberties and public education). But see THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, reprinted in BURKE AND PAINE: ON
REVOLUTION AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 248-262 (Robert B. Dishman ed., 1971) (criticizing
contemporary welfare polices and urging the adoption of an income maintenance system). See
generally STAUGHTON LYND, INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RADICALISM (1968)
(describing origin and development of American radical tradition); Robert F. Williams, The

State Constitutions of the FoundingDecade: Pennsylvania'sRadical 1776 Constitution and its
Influence on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541 (1989) (describing importance of Pennsylvania's 1776 constitution to American law).
This is not to suggest that any form of socialism recognizable by a European ever took
root in this country, or that those conditions which enabled socialism to flourish there ever
existed here. As George Santayana observed: "When [an American] has given his neighbor a
chance he thinks he has done enough for him. It will take some hammering to drive a coddling socialism into America." GEORGE SANTAYANA, CHARACTER AND OPINION IN THE
UNITED STATES 106 (1920). Cf. PETER BALDWIN, THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY:
CLASS BASES OF THE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE 1875-1975 (1990); CARL LANDAUER ET
AL., EUROPEAN SOCIALISM: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MOVEMENTS (1959). See generally
VERNON LOUIS PARRINGTON, THE BEGINNING OF CRITICAL REALISM IN AMERICA (1927-

1930) (historical Americanization of imported ideas).
Indeed, the public welfare provisions of state constitutions were for the most part intended for paupers, incompetents, women, and children. See John Stuart Mill, The Province of
Government, reprintedin VIRGINIA HELD, PROPERTY, PROFITS AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE 178,

182 (1980). It should be noted that Mill, unlike most of his contemporaries, rejected the

"classing together, for this and other purposes, of women and children" as "both indefensible
in principle and mischievous in practice." Id.

63. VA. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 15.
64. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXII. See generally GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS (1960) (discussing history of Massachusetts law in the
colonial period); DAVID G. ALLEN, IN ENGLISH WAYS: THE MOVEMENT OF SOCIETIES AND
THE TRANSFERAL OF ENGLISH LOCAL LAW AND CUSTOM TO MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN THE

SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1981) (exploring English influence on Massachusetts laws and customs in the 17th century).
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Recent domination by a foreign king left few colonies willing to relinquish their authority to a strong central government. The states therefore retained responsibility for the general welfare of their people even
after the formation of the Union. 65 While the actual provision of economic rights may seem meager by contemporary standards, these early
constitutions established the states as the primary source of economic
rights. 66 As constitutional texts they endured despite desuetude and periods of virtual federal preemption, to reemerge as solid foundations for
the "New Federalism" two hundred years later.
2.

The "New Federalism"

The Framers of the Constitution never intended the federal government to assume the public welfare obligations of the states. 67 Although
far-reaching social welfare programs such as Medicaid 68 and Social Security 69 have been enacted on the federal level, they have never been con65. See James E. Herget, The Missing Power of Local Governments: A Divergence Between Text and Practicein Our Early State Constitutions, 62 VA. L. REV. 999 (1976) (arguing
that crucial government powers were not provided for in those early constitutions). In any
case, the "natural law" theory at the core of the newly formed federal government offered little
support for welfare benefits. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 101.
66. They also established the pattern for the division of responsibility between the states
and the federal government, by creating a vacuum in the latter. This became self-replicating,
requiring states that later joined the Union to similarly assume police power responsibilities.
For an ambitious and often persuasive attempt to ground this process in the Ninth Amendment, see Eric B. Schnurer, It is a Constitution We Are Expanding: An Essay on Constitutional
Past, Present and Future, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 135 (1988).
67. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 45, at 288
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The JurisprudenceofFederalismAfter Garcia, 8 Sup. Cr. REV. 341 (1985)
(discussing how Framers of Constitution used the concept of state sovereignty in analyzing
relation between states and federal government); infra note 129 and accompanying text.
I agree, however, with those commentators who have suggested that the federal government could constitutionally do so. As they have noted, ours is a "living" constitution, and it
has evolved in response to changing societal needs. See, e.g., Michelman, Protectingthe Poor,
supra note 11; Symposium, ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 259 (1981); Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1988).
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stitutionally required. 70 The federal government has7 1always been legally
free to shift these responsibilities back to the states.
The most recent movement to do so began in the 1970s.7 2 The term
"New Federalism" was first used in the 1970s to describe the protection
70. The Supreme Court has firmly refused to protect affirmative economic rights. See
supra note 11. Susan Frelich Appleton has argued that "McRae and Zbaraz unequivocally
confirm that governmental protection of the poor... is a matter to be resolved democratically,
in accordance with majoritarian will." Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributionsoftthe Abortion-FundingCases to Fundamental-RightsAnalysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 722-23 (1981). For a concise
account of the futile efforts in the 1960s and 1970s to "derive a set of positive floors" from the
federal Constitution, see Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive
Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 886 (1989) [hereinafter Neuborne, State Constitutions].
71. See, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. 23, 95
Stat. 357, 843-60 (1981) (making most "working poor" ineligible for public assistance under
Aid to Families with Dependent Children); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole,79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979). It may not be politically feasible, of
course, for the federal government to attempt such a shift. See, e.g., Invest in the Future? Yes,
but How?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1991, at A14 ("The idea of paring payments to the elderly
strikes terror into Congressional hearts.").
72. In the last half of the century, "states' rights" have been invoked by those seeking to
avoid federally imposed integration and civil rights. Indeed, the almost monotonous cries for
"states' rights" among Southern politicians in the 1950s and 1960s have been interpreted as
"coded slurs" against blacks by communication experts. Martin Gottlieb, When High Officials
Seem to Speak in Racist Innuendo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991, at E18; see Weston U.S. Ratification of ICESCR, supra note 13, at 32-33 (objecting to "state sovereignty" reservation in ratification of covenant on civil and political rights for the same reason).
Politicians may be distinguished from judges, however---especially judges with tenure.
See JOSEPH GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME COURT

JUSTICE (1989). Although the post-Reconstruction constitutions of Southern states "often institutionaliz[ed] Jim Crow," Howard, Renaissance of State ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 59,
at 4, many state courts have staunchly protected rights during the past 20 years, see sources
cited infra note 76; for a survey, see Developments in State Constitutional Law: 1989, 21
RUTGERS L.J. 915, 915-79 (1989). They have needed a solid legal foundation, such as a state
constitution, to do so. See, e.g., supra notes 59, 62; infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
ICESCR would provide a similar foundation.
This is not to suggest that there would be no attempts to eviscerate economic rights in
certain states. There are many ways to check such efforts. See, e.g., infra text accompanying
notes 119-124 (discussing the notion of a "federal floor"); infra text accompanying notes 187206 (unequivocal Committee guidelines on subsistence and nondiscrimination); infra text accompanying notes 80-84 (growth of supportive state constitutional jurisprudence). Nevertheless, the evolution of norms remains a complex and subtle process, subject to unforeseeable
mutations. But see infra note 214. While states arguably offer the more promising forums for
economic rights in the early 1990s, the attractiveness and utility of state tribunals may well
shift, depending on the relative attractiveness, utility, and availability of their federal counterparts in a given situation. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1977) (arguing that federal courts are more likely than state courts to effectively enforce negative rights).
Finally, the lack of "local control" over economic rights programs has been a major argument of their opponents. The proposal made here, in accordance with the ICESCR scheme,
should satisfy those who really mean "local control." Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An
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of individual rights by state courts under their own constitutions. 73 In
the 1980s, the term was expanded to include state protection of economic
rights previously guaranteed by the federal government. President Reagan consolidated federal programs into block grants, for example, dramatically increasing state discretion and responsibility in social policy
74
spending.
Both aspects of the "New Federalism" have invigorated the conception of public entitlement under state constitutions. The development of
a distinctive constitutional jurisprudence of individual rights, tailored to
local norms and reflecting local needs, has provided a model for evolving
economic rights. 75 The creative reconstruction of the law of individual
Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51, 54-57 (1989); see infra text accompanying notes
102-116, 118-126, 135-153. Those for whom "local control" is a euphemism for exclusion of
the poor or people of color would have to scramble for new rhetoric. The distinction between
sincere proponents and those seeking to exclude may well be blurred, however, even to members of both groups. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591,
1606-07 (1988).
73. Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a PrincipledInterpretationof
the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977) [hereinafter Collins, Toward a Principled
Interpretation];see Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: Reliance on State Constitutions-Beyond
the "New Federalism," 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. vi, vii (1985); cf.Laurence Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) (suggesting that the decision should be
understood as another example of the Court's recognition of state sovereignty). But see Earl
M. Maltz, False Prophet--Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429 (1988) (concerns of federalism do not support the kind of liberal
state court activism encouraged by Justice Brennan). See generally Jerome B. Falk Jr., The
State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"NonfederalGround, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273 (1973)
(discussing state courts' willingness to read their state constitutions independently of Federal
Bill of Rights). For a summary of the arguments against relying on state constitutions to
promote individual rights, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "New JudicialFederalism" and Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989) [hereinafter Collins, The Once "New Judicial Federalism'].
74. There has always been a tug-of-war between the states and the federal government.
Under the "New Federalism," the federal government dropped the rope; see Ronald Reagan,
State of the Union Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 72, 76 (January 26, 1982); Jason DeParle, The
Fight to Save Children Shifts to the Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1991, § 4, at 4; Michael
de Courey Hinds, Governors Say Budget Plan Shifts More Burdens to States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
5, 1990, at A1; Martin Tolchin, States Take Up New Burdens to Payfor New Federalism, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1990, at Al. See generally William L. Webster, The 1990 Foulston & Siefkin
Lecture: The Emerging Role of State Attorneys General and the New Federalism, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1990) (describing how states have enjoyed renaissance in administrative and
regulatory power); Alan W. Houseman, The Vitality of Goldberg v. Kelly to Welfare Advocacy
in the 1990s, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 831, 835 (1990) (describing states' substantial regulatory
leeway in operating welfare programs).
75. See Neuborne, State Constitutions,supra note 70, at 898-99 ("the laboratory model of
horizontal federalism" is well suited to evolving economic rights); see also New State Ice Co. v.
Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312,
344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of
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rights has given lawyers, litigants, and the judiciary a sense of the limitations76 as well as the possibilities of the law77 for assuring economic
rights. The massive cutbacks in some federal programs, and the shift to
state management of many of those remaining, have given new urgency
to the development of state social welfare programs. At the same time,
the lack of adequate models-or methods for devising them-and the
drastic reduction of financial support have left many states foundering,
78
desperately seeking new approaches.
Given the states' historic role, and federal abandonment, primary
responsibility for public welfare rests with state legislatures and state law.
While legislatures and statutory protections may vacillate, state constitutions are a durable source of economic rights. 79 State courts have, in
fact, recognized a broad range of "constitutional" economic rights, finding that their people are constitutionally entitled to free public educathe Crocodile: State Court Comment on FederalConstitutionalIssues When Disposingof Cases
on State ConstitutionalGrounds,63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1045 (1985); DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1988) (discussing state and local experimentation ,vith new solutions to social and economic problems). Hawaii, for example, provides near-universal health
care at almost half the cost of other states. Timothy Egan, Hawaii Shows It Can Offer Health
Insurancefor All, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1991, at Al.
The practical advantages of tailoring solutions to local circumstances are increasingly being recognized in other nations as well. See, e.g., Second Session Report, supra note 49, at 39
(describing new focus on local needs in Norway).
76. Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird, for example, lost her seat
on the court as a result of her "activism." See, e.g., Paul Alpern, Note, JudiciaryElectionThe 1986 Electionsfor the CaliforniaSupreme Court, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 751 (1987);
John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the
Electorate, and the Issue of JudicialAccountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987).
77. See Note, The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324
(1982); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90
HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977); DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
59, at 10; MARY CORNELIA PORTER & G. ALAN TARR, STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1982). But see James A. Gardner, The FailedDiscourse of
State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (1992) (arguing that "contrary to the
claims of New Federalism, state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing,
conflicting and essentially unintelligible pronouncements").
78. Michael de Courcy Hinds & Erik Eckholm, 80s Leave States and Cities in Need, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at Al. Funding such programs puts a strain on already pinched state
budgets, sometimes resulting in improvident measures. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, States
Seeking Aid on Budgets From Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at Al.
79. Seventeen states permit constitutional initiatives, which enable voters to amend their
constitutions without a constitutional convention. Economic rights have rarely been the subject of these initiatives. Janice C. May, The ConstitutionalInitiative: A Threat to Rights?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES, supra note 59, at 162, 168-69.
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83
tion,80 welfare, 81 affordable housing, 82 health benefits, and abortions.
The states, in trying to meet these obligations, have created benefit programs and agencies to administer them, which further legitimate and define emerging economic rights.8 5 Because of their traditional
responsibilities, and the attendant institutional structures developed to
meet them,8 6 the states have become the most promising source of eco7
nomic rights in the 1990s.8

80. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977) (scheme similar to that which
was upheld in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), overturned as
violative of state constitution). For a comprehensive overview, see Note, supra note 77, at
1350-1459. See generally Mark G. Yudof, Effective Schools and Federal and State Constitutions: A Variety of Opinions, 63 TEX. L. REV. 865 (1985) (reproducing test of state supreme
court ruling regarding the legal duty of a school district to incorporate the practices of effective
schools); Howard, Renaissanceof State ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 59, at 12 nn.47-48 (illustrating state courts' use of state constitutions in public education litigation).
81. E.g., Tucker v. Toia, 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
82. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983) (assuring the right to an "opportunity" for affordable housing).
83. See GA. CONST. of 1877, art. IX, § III, para. I; MISS. CONST. of 1890, art. XIV,
§ 262. Here, as in other areas, legislative initiatives may render appeal to the state constitution
unnecessary. See generally Timothy Egan, A State Offers Working PoorInsurance Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1989, at Al (Washington state helps working poor buy health insurance). Some
countries, similarly, meet ICESCR requirements without further measures. See infra note 190.
84. E.g., Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981) (granting state
constitutional protection to Medicaid recipients seeking medically necessary abortions); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981).
85. The results, predictably, have been mixed. ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT GREENSTEIN,
HOLES IN

THE SAFETY NETS:

POVERTY PROGRAMS AND POLICIES IN THE STATES 1-3

(1988); see also Rhoda Schulzinger & Paula Roberts, Welfare Reform in the States: Fact or
Fiction? (pt. 1), 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 695 (1987); cf. Second Session Report, supra note
49, at 22 (representative from Denmark, which spends more than 50% of its national budget
on welfare, housing, labor and education, compared his country's efforts to "security nets
through which no one must be allowed to fall").
86. See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
87. There are, of course, some conspicuous exceptions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIII;
see also Note, Local Taxes, FederalCourts, and School Desegregationin the Proposition 13 Era,
78 MICH. L. REV. 587 (1980). There is also an emerging "antiwelfare" movement, or at least a
growing perception in certain states that existing programs require serious reform. See, e.g.,
Jason DeParle, California Plan to Cut Welfare May Prompt Others to Follow, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1991, at A1; Jason DeParle, The Sorrows, and Surprises,After a Welfare Plan Ends,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at Al (describing Michigan's termination of $240 million program
for employable adults as perhaps the "most dramatic national standard in a budget cutting
season"). Some advocates of program cuts focus on the inefficiency of programs and the lack
of accountability of their administrators. Others denounce the demoralizing impact on recipients. Proposals for "workfare" may be seen as efforts to avoid this. See generally Joel F.
Handler, The Transformationof Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The Family Support
Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 462-65 (1987-1988); John
Glowacki, Work and Welfare in America: A Synthesis Approach, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
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Structural Comparisons

There are two major structural similarities between ICESCR and
domestic state constitutions. First, both are framed in statements of general principle rather than in the detailed language of regulations or statutes. As a corollary, both act as guiding directives, occupying the
highest rank in the hierarchy of law. Second, both function in tandem
with another free-standing system of law. State constitutions must be
coordinated with federal law, and the Covenant must be coordinated

with the domestic law of each party.
A state's constitution sets out the broad precepts under which its
people are to be governed. While state constitutions differ widely in

terms of specificity,88 they generally leave the actual content of rights to
be determined by the courts or the legislature. As an international statement of obligations that governments owe their people, the Covenant is
similarly indeterminate.89 While the Covenant's broad formulations

& PUB. POL'Y 243 (1985) (describing workfare as important element in proposal to eliminate
defects of current welfare system).
Welfare cuts may also reflect the absence of an adequate countermajoritarian mechanism,
such as ICESCR, to protect the interests of the poor minority. As Neuborne pointed out,
"democracy and negative rights may no longer be effective vehicles for dealing with the structural needs of a chronically weak and permanently outvoted underclass." Neuborne, State
Constitutions, supra note 70, at 883; accord Bradley R. Hogin, Equal Protection,Democratic
Theory, and the Case of the Poor, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1989); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
This is obviously a complex and highly charged topic. ICESCR does not prescribe a
model, but offers instead a method of mediating priorities, encouraging public discourse and
promoting bureaucratic accountability. ICESCR would not halt backlash movements, but it
could slow their momentum, particularly when "core" norms were involved. But see Handler,
supra at 515 (describing deleterious political consequences of shifting responsibility for welfare
policy from the federal government to the states). See generally infra text accompanying notes
187-206.
88. The New York state constitution is among the more detailed. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST.
art. 17, § 1. Others merely refer generally to the "promotion of the public welfare." See, e.g.,
N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 1.
89. Its drafters, like the drafters of the state constitutions, were more concerned with
establishing a workable process for determining the content of these rights. They were also
sensitive to issues of cultural relativism. For a carefully constructed argument that a "defensible modern conception of human dignity" would have to include basic economic rights, see
Jack Donnelly, CulturalRelativismand UniversalHuman Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 747 (1984).
See generally RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION (Michael Krausz ed.,

1989) (critically analyzing relativism);

ALLISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL

RIGHTS 61-87 (1990) (arguing that the legitimacy of human rights derives from moral
authority); David Bidney, CulturalRelativism, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 542, 543-47 (1968) (explaining cultural relativism as a method in ethnology,
a theory of cultural determinism, and a guide to the evaluation of value systems); Allison
Dundes Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge of Relativism and the Consequencesfor Human
HUMAN
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have been criticized as vague and merely hortatory, 90 our state courts
have long been required to interpret language at least as open-ended.
State constitutions, like the Covenant, already require law makers and
decisionmakers to ascertain the substance of nebulous rights. 9 1
The principles set forth in state constitutions are not only guiding,
but controlling. This is true in any legal system providing for judicial
review, on constitutional grounds, of legislative acts. 92 ICESCR similarly requires other state law to conform to its basic precepts, or at least
to avoid undermining or contradicting them. We take this mechanism
for granted in the United States, but it is far from universal. In South
Africa, Great Britain, and Israel, for example, where the constitutions
are unwritten, the legislatures can and do override judicial determinations of constitutionality on a regular basis. 93
The second major structural similarity between state constitutions
and ICESCR is that both must be integrated with other legal systems.
Federalism has given us exhaustive experience with this kind of synthesis. ICESCR would be treated essentially like state constitutional law
with one important distinction: under the Supremacy Clause, 94 the CovRights, 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 514 (1985) (exploring tension between cultural relativism and human
rights).
In addition, as Professor Sohn has pointed out, "[O]n the one hand, acceptance of the
lowest possible common denominator would assure rapid ratification, but the documents
would have no real effect; on the other hand, strict adherence to high ideals might lead states
to refuse to ratify the documents, and the instruments would thus be of little value." Sohn,
supra note 7, at 39.
90. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 8, at 98.
91. Cf. Steven Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1443 (1990) (exploring implications of "situatedness" as applied to development, practice, and "attempted reconstruction of constitutional law"). See generally
Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987)
(arguing that law is "a communal language" and urging that it be interpreted in "social contexts in which norms can be generated and given meaning"); Anthony D'Amato, Pragmatic
Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 148 (1990) (arguing that there is no determinate evidence
that the "core meaning" of words is the same to one person as it is to another person).
92. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative
Supremacy, and Federalismin the ConstitutionalTraditions of Canadaand the United States,
1990 DUKE L.J. 1229.
93. HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 176; A. Leon Higginbotham Jr. et
al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit
for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 763. In some countries it matters little whether there
is a constitution, written or unwritten. Jimmy Carter, The Rule of Law and the State of
Human Rights, 4 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 3 (1991) (describing "too many countries [where] the
final decisions are made by the government itself, depending on transient circumstances... No
higher law constrains the State.").
94. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. For an analysis of the effect of this clause, see Peter
Weston, The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis
Henkin, 101 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514 (1987) [hereinafter Weston, Foreign Treaties in US.
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enant would become the supreme law of the land, subject only to the
federal Constitution. 95 Because ICESCR would not be subordinated to
federal statutes, 96 unlike state constitutions, the federal role would essentially be limited to defining a "floor."'97 While this would not foreclose
debate on the proper scope of federal and state action, it would situate
that debate within familiar parameters.
ICESCR has no legally binding precedent, nor does it directly generate any. This major difference between ICESCR and state constitutions is conceptually a complementary one. Although the Committee
has developed Covenant "guidelines," 9 8 and a jurisprudence is slowly

evolving, 99 this jurisprudence is slight in comparison to our rich constitu-

tional tradition. Conflicts would probably be few and avoidable. Indeed,
the Committee's recent comments suggest that it would welcome an infusion of rigorous rights discourse.10 0 The difference in the way precedent
is treated is better understood, accordingly, as a further inducement for
ratification rather than as an obstacle to it.
The explicit provision in the Committee's Commentary for "public
participation" in implementing economic rights presents another structural difference between ICESCR and state constitutions. It suggests
Courts] (Supremacy Clause makes federal law self-executing in state courts, and requires state
court judges to hear federal claims and hold federal law superior to conflicting state law).
95. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1957); see Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between CongressionalPower andInternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time
Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988) (U.S. courts will uphold the
Constitution even if doing so causes the United States to be in violation of a treaty).
The explicit reservation as to constitutionality (that the United States will uphold its obligations under a treaty except to the extent that those obligations might conflict with the U.S.
Constitution) remains hotly debated. While included in President Carter's letter of transmittal
to the Senate, the reservation has been criticized as both "superfluous" and "arrogant." See
Weston, U.S. Ratification ofICESCR, supra note 13; Rovine & Goldklang, supra note 13. See
generally Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide,
1951 I.C.J. 15 (a nation may be considered a party to the convention even if ratified with
certain reservations); Oscar Schachter, The Obligation of the Partiesto Give Effect to the Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 462 (1979) (questioning whether series of
reservations is consistent with purpose of Covenant).
96. See John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A PolicyAnalysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 313 (1992) ("directly applied treaty has the same status as federal
laws"). For a discussion of whether ICESCR could be superseded by subsequent federal legislation, see infra text accompanying notes 127-130.
97. For a description of the proposed scheme, see infra text accompanying notes 119-124.
98. See Fifth Session Report, supra note 49, at 6, 88; infra text accompanying notes 132151.
99. See infra notes 152-154, 190-191, 195-198 and accompanying text. But see infra text
accompanying notes 210-212 (noting the relative alacrity with which norms regarding economic rights are being articulated and recognized).
100. See MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 75-76.
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some undefined role for a "public" not limited to potential plaintiffs, 10
which may well include those who lack justiciable claims or who simply
cannot afford lawyers. Although state constitutions do not so directly
trigger what we consider a political function, economic rights issues
(such as school desegregation and affordable housing) frequently inspire
"town meetings" or public hearings at some stage. 102 Much of this, like
economic rights litigation, is in response to some catastrophe. Involving
the public prospectively is a complex problem. By explicitly requiring
parties to publicize ICESCR and to describe their efforts to assure a role
for the general populace, the Covenant pushes governments to take the
critical first step beyond theoretical discussion.103
101. See Limburg Principles,supra note 3, at 124 ("Popular participation is required at all
stages, including the formulation, application and review of national policies."). ICESCR resonates with recent American calls for a "republican revival." As Paul Brest has noted, " 'minimum protections' for the necessities of life . . . are preconditions for civic republican
citizenship." Paul Brest, FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1628 (1988); see also Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A
Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988). But see Richard A. Epstein,
Modern Republicanism-orthe Flightfrom Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633 (1988). See generally Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-19
(1986); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Law's
Republic] (suggesting that in the context of a new republican dialogue, constitutional theory
can inspire stronger judicial protection of individual rights than can competing theories); Pope,
supra note 50 (discussing major implications of republican movements and direct popular
power for legal doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988) (exploring the implications of republicanism for modern public law).
State constitutions, similarly, originated in a "Whig tradition emphasizing direct, active,
continuing popular control . . . of government." Renaissance of State ConstitutionalLaw,
supra note 59, at 2; see also DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL:
WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1980).
102. Americans have a vigorous tradition of participatory democracy, surpassing citizens
of other industrialized nations in voluntary association membership, especially when such as-

sociations are devoted to solving community problems.
TION AND POLITICAL EQUALITY:

A

SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., PARTICIPA-

SEVEN NATION COMPARISON

(1978) (cited in

ROBERT

BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN

321 n.1 (1985) [hereinafter HABITS OF THE HEART]). This is a long-standing and frequently noted phenonemon. See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
523 (J. Mayer ed., 1969). Our cultural heritage seems to predispose us to exactly the kind of
involvement ICESCR seeks to promote. For a perceptive and thorough discussion of the
twists and complexities that characterize that heritage in contemporary America, and probably
devaluate it for ICESCR purposes, see HABITS OF THE HEART, supra, at 167-218. See generally Pope, supra note 50 (addressing the problem of popular democracy from the republican
perspective). Democratic participation may also conflict with countermajoritarian norms of
the Covenant, as it has with such norms in state constitutions. See James M. Fischer, Ballot
Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11
LIFE

HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 43 (1983).

103. While it could be argued that both the indefiniteness of the mandate and its ambiguous legal status leave considerable discretion to the states, these requirements, in conjunction
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The structural similarities between ICESCR and state constitutions,
in conjunction with the conceptual affinities described above, suggest a
niche for ICESCR in our system. While this niche was carved out by
state constitutions, it is by no means preemptively occupied by them. I
am not suggesting a panacea, or a perfect fit. But there is enough common ground, and there are sufficient similarities in climate and culture,
for international conceptions of economic rights to take root and flourish
in the United States. 1 4 Grafted onto our own strong and growing state
traditions, they can help us cultivate a uniquely American jurisprudence
of economic rights.

II. The Covenant and Our Federal System-Toward
Functional Integration
As described above, the states are embracing a conception of economic rights already endorsed by the vast majority of industrialized democracies. This Part explores the possibilities for state participation,
within the framework of federalism,10 5 in the international economic
rights regime. It is a sketch, not a blueprint. To build on the emerging
domestic consensus and to best shape the international approach to economic problems to local needs, ratification should be structured so that
primary responsibility for implementing the Covenant lies with the
with the possibility of private lawsuits to enforce them, effectively limit that discretion to a
choice of means. It would be difficult for a state to argue, for example, that "public participation" required no more than a notice in a newspaper. Cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(2) (notice
requirements in class action suits). See generally HARRIS, supra note 5, at 670.
104. See PARRINGTON, supra note 62. Professor Parrington's thesis was that "two rival
philosophies contended for supremacy in America; the humanitarian philosophy of the French
Enlightenment [epitomized in Jeffersonian democracy] ... and the English philosophy of laissez faire [finding expression in 'mercantile, capitalist America ... and Hamiltonian Federalism']." Id. at iii. While he felt, writing in the 1920s, that the "finer spirit of the Enlightenment
was lost," he exhorted, "[y]et not too hastily should we abandon our earlier faith ....
Jefferson was not as foolish as many of his disciples have been, and Jeffersonian democracy still
offers hope." Id. at xxvii, xxxii-xxxiii. Professor Henkin not only believes that the tenets of
the Enlightenment could in fact thrive here, but through the power of his vision (and more
than eighteen published books) has helped ensure that they play a major role in contemporary
political and legal discourse. See Barbara Stark, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 733, 733-34
(1991) (reviewing LouIs HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990)).
Professor Alston, from the unique perspective of one who has actually been a member of
the Committee and taught at Harvard as well as law schools in his native Australia, sees
ICESCR's potential for focusing a hitherto unwieldy coalition-ICESCR as a kind of trellis
which could support and bring together various meandering movements. See Alston, Need for
an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 392-93.
105. Cf U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty ....
). For a
concise discussion of the capacity of constituent states in federations such as Switzerland, Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico, and the USSR to enter into agreements with other nations, see
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 401-03.
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states. 106 After describing the basic framework below, I explain how the
integrated system would actually work.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the allocation of
responsibility for economic rights among the three constituent branches
of government on either the state or federal level, except for three brief
observations. First, a threshold premise here is that there is (or could be,
if ICESCR is properly promoted) 10 7 the political will and popular consensus to subscribe to the basic tenets of the Covenant.1 0 8 Reflecting that
consensus, it is assumed that all three branches would cooperate to effec106. But see Richard B. Steward, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 337
(1990) [hereinafter Steward, Madison's Nightmare] ("As theorists of fiscal federalism have
shown, there are grave structural impediments to providing [welfare and social services]
through a system of decentralized government."). See generally Paul L. Hoffman, The Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law in State Courts: A View From California, 18 INT'L
LAW. 61, 61 (1984) ("focus[ing] on the use of international human rights law.., to provide
specific content to broad norms such as equal protection or due process of law ....").
107. See Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17. See generally Winston
P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potentialfor United States Adoption and Enforcement of the Convention Against Torture, the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and CulturalRights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 311, 330-38 (1990) (describing
constituencies for ratification).
108. This is more than wishful thinking. Support for this premise may be found throughout this Article. See for example, supra note 26 (concerns about increasing poverty); Egan,
supra note 83, and Milt Freudenheim, On Health Insurance, Some States Are Going Back to
Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1992, at A5 (the increasing clamor for basic health care, especially among the middle class); supra note 80, and infra note 158 (growing concern about
access to quality public education); supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text (endorsement of
these tenets by the Bush administration in international instruments); supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text (fact that even the most fanatical can no longer link espousal of economic
rights to Soviet influence); Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17 (growing
demand for economic rights by groups identified by Alston); and supra notes 74, 78 and accompanying text (increasing burden on states to meet the basic needs of their people, especially
the most vulnerable segments of their populations). In short, while it is beyond the scope of
this Article to empirically prove this premise, an ample and credible foundation has been established for what remains a relatively modest proposition.
Ratification of the Covenant under the scheme outlined here simply represents legal adherence to general principles, many (if not most) of which are already familiar to many (if not
most) state governments. The clarification, as well as specific methods of implementation, of
these principles is basically left to the states. Adherence to ICESCR triggers, rather than
determines, the process. The states would still have to devise their own particular solutions,
including formal legal solutions as well as ad hoc measures, to their own particular problems.
This would be similar to the process through which international adherence to various
hortatory declarations has historically developed into "hard" treaty law. The Treaty on Principles Governing States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, for example, first took the
form of "soft" accession to general principles. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (recalling G.A. Res. 1962, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 15, U.N.
Doc. A/5515 (1963), and G.A. Res. 1884, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 13, U.N.
Doc. A/5515 (1963)). See generally Christine Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Develop-
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tuate the purposes of the Covenant. Indeed, they would be required to
do so as a matter of law. Second, as a general principle, ICESCR does
not specify any particular means of implementation, nor impose any limitations.10 9 These matters are left to be determined domestically. 110
Third, to some extent the ongoing debates about "judicial activism" and
"countermajoritarian checks" reflect serious concerns about governmental accountability and participation in the design of programs-if not actual control by-those they are intended to benefit. It is precisely
because it addresses such concerns, on a practical and mundane level,
that the ICESCR process holds such great promise for many
Americans. 11
A. A Framework for ICESCR in the States
I propose that the United States ratify the Covenant" I2 with two
important understandings." 3 First, we must acknowledge that it is a
self-executing treaty.114 This means that no further domestic legislation
ment and Change in InternationalLaw, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 856-59 (1989) (discussing
transformation of "soft" law treaties into "hard" law in economic areas).
This may be a long-term process, especially where human rights are involved. See infra
text accompanying note 210. The Universal Declaration, originally "aspirational," "hardened" into treaty law in the Covenants. It is "now widely accepted as an authoritative interpretation of the human rights clauses of the U.N. Charter." NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 7, at 664. The principles of the Universal Declaration continue to gain legitimacy and
clarity through domestic implementation and international protocols. Enforcement of the
Universal Declaration, like that of any human rights treaty, depends primarily on domestic
enforcement. Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 420-24
(1979).
109. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
110. Nor does ICESCR expressly contemplate or favor any particular theory or approach.
See infra note 134 and accompanying text. Our current domestic crisis, and the lack of any
coherent consensus as to its cause or solution, has generated wide-ranging scholarship and
commentary. See, eg., CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, PovERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS (1992); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN AMERICA (1992); sources cited supra note 26. The

ICESCR process is intended to neutrally facilitate whatever program is adopted, as long as
that program does not violate ICESCR's explicit norms. See infra text accompanying notes
187-188. ICESCR offers little guidance in selecting among alternative theories or programs,
although the Committee Reports serve an educational or clearinghouse function, alerting parties to approaches adopted by similarly situated states dealing with similar problems. See infra
text accompanying notes 151-154.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 114-133; see also infra note 204.
112. See Craig H. Baab, The Processfor United States Ratification of Human Rights Instruments, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 265 (1990).
113. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 42, art. 31(4) ("A special
meaning shall be given to a term [of a treaty] if it is established that the parties so intended.").
114. Wedgewood, ASIL PROC. (Amer. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 19, 1991;
see Louis Henkin, Lexical Priority or "PoliticalQuestion". A Response, 101 HARV. L. REV.
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would be required to give it the status of law. Second, we must stipulate
that responsibility for compliance would initially repose in the states.
The United States would ultimately be accountable under international
law, but delegation to the states as a threshold matter is well within the
scheme of the Covenant.1 15 It is also permissible under established prin'1 6
ciples of domestic federalism.
524, 533 (1987) (Treaties should be considered "self-executing whenever the character of the
undertaking permits."); Oscar Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human
Rights Provisionsin American Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 644-46 (1951) (A treaty should be
considered self-executing unless it explicitly provides otherwise or "the power to deal with [its
subject matter] is vested solely in the legislature."). But see Transmittal Letter, supra note 13
(Covenants are not self-executing.); Alfred de Zayas, The Potentialfor the United States Joining the Covenant Family, 20 GA. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 299, 304 (1990) ("[I]t is intrinsic in a
covenant that is to be implemented progressively that it is not self-executing"). Under U.S.
constitutional practice, "treaty-making officials, as a unilateral matter, will control the determination of 'self-executing' in the domestic legal system." Jackson, supra note 96, at 329. See
generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) (examining
the history of the judicial distinction between "self-executing" and "non-self-executing" treaties and analyzing its continuing implications).
It should be noted that American courts have held human rights provisions of the U.N.
Charter non-self-executing. See, e.g., Frolova v. U.S.S.R., 761 F.2d 370, 374 n.5 (7th Cir.
1985); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952); Charles W. Stotter, Self-Executing Treaties
and the Human Rights Provisionsof the United Nations Charter: A Separation of Powers Problem, 25 BuFF. L. REV. 773, 773 (1976).
Although some parties, such as Portugal, have incorporated the Covenant into their national law, Alston and Quinn have observed that "an obligation to incorporate cannot be deduced from the text of Article 2 and no such proposal was even considered during the drafting
of the Covenant." Alston & Quinn, Nature and Scope of Parties' Obligations,supra note 9, at
166. For a more detailed discussion, see id. annex at 223-29 (legislative drafting history of
Article 2(1)). Under parliamentary systems, legislative enactment is necessary for incorporation of the Covenant. In Sweden, for example, despite executive ratification, the Covenant has
never been incorporated into domestic law.
Prior to ratification, however, pertinent Swedish legislation had been submitted to a
careful review in order to ascertain to what extent it was in conformity with the
Covenant. No major adjustments had then been deemed necessary. Subsequent to
ratification, any proposals for new legislation falling within the area covered by the
Covenant must likewise be submitted to a corresponding review before their adoption
as law in order to guarantee compatibility.
Second Session Report, supra note 49, at 26.
115. Such delegation has been accepted in connection with other federal states. See, e.g.,
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Implementation of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Federal Republic of Germany, U.N. Doc. E/1986/
4/Add. 10 (1986) and Canada, U.N. Doc. E/1984/7/Add.28 (1984) [hereinafter Canadian Report]. See generally Daniel Turp, Le Cdntrole du Respect du Pacte InternationalRelatifaux
Droits Economiques, Sociaux et Culturels, in MtLANGES MICHAEL VIRALLY (1990); AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM (Brian Galligan ed., 1989); Andrew Byrnes & Hilary Charlesworth, Federalism and the InternationalLegal Order: Recent Developments in Australia, 79 AM. J.INT'L L.
622 (1985); H. Burmester, The Australian States and Participationin the Foreign Policy Process, 9 FED. L. REV. 257 (1978); Stephen A. Scott, Constituent Authority and the Canadian
Provinces, 12 McGILL L.J. 528 (1966-1967).
116. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); cf.RESTATE-
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Upon ratification, the Covenant would become directly binding on
the states.' 17 State courts would decide whether state governments were
meeting their obligations under ICESCR, and the substantive norms of
the Covenant would basically be interpreted as if they appeared in the
text of the state constitution. In some states, ICESCR would build on
state constitutional jurisprudence, particularly in the areas of public education, welfare, and housing in which state courts have been most active." 8 State constitutions and the Covenant would be construed in pari
materia and claimants could rely on either or both.
Federal jurisprudence would be limited to the articulation of a minimal standard below which a state could not fall without jeopardizing
national compliance with the Covenant, 19 and, of course, handling chalMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES introductory
note to pt. I, ch. 2, at 41 (1986) (During the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
a state's determination of customary law was not subject to removal jurisdiction. This changed
after Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
117. As explained supra note 14 and accompanying text, and infra note 129, it is widely
accepted that the federal government can bind the states with respect to social welfare programs. This does not preclude the argument that the delegation proposed here exceeds Congress's powers. But see Louis Henkin, The Constitution, Treaties and InternationalHuman
Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012, 1017 n.28 (1968). See generally Note, State Enforcement of
Federally CreatedRights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1960) (considering whether states have a
constitutional obligation to enforce federal rights).
An essential premise is that the states could be persuaded, rather than compelled, to accept this delegation. Many states would immediately realize, and others could probably be
convinced, that it was in their own best interest. See supra note 42. Of course, the possibility
of protracted litigation against a determined federal government could be a significant factor.
For a critical discussion of federal interference with states' freedom to allocate resources, see
Kaden, supra note 71, at 868-83; see also Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA.
L. REV. 917, 970-73 (1985) (reexamining the constitutionality of conditional grants).
118. Mary P. Galie, Social Services andEqualitarianActivism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
STATES, supra note 59, at 98. In many cases, this would involve an expansion of an already
recognized right. To the extent it requires a normative shift, political friction would be reduced through the ICESCR process. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103; infra note
138. The only inflexible norms are those against discrimination, already well established in our
law, and the requirement that subsistence be provided for the "most vulnerable"; that is, that
we remove the commitment to keep our own people alive from the rough-and-tumble of local
politics. See infra text accompanying notes 187-206; cf. RICHARD B. LILLICH, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW, INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 16-18 (1985) (considering how international human
rights law could "infuse" domestic standards).
119. The Supreme Court has endorsed the concept of a federal floor in the context of state
and federal constitutional law. See, eg., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) ("A state is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those
[required by] federal constitutional standards [,b]ut... a State may not impose such greater
restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when [The Supreme Court] specifically
refrains from imposing them."); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 484 (1972) (concerning the
required burden of proof in the use of coerced confessions in state criminal trials). Standards
could be determined on a state by state basis or a national standard could be articulated. A
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lenges under the federal Constitution. 120 Absent a preliminary showing
of state violation, 121 there would be no removal jurisdiction because there
hybrid scheme with a "floating" floor would also be possible. See Carol F. Peterkort, The
Conflict Between State and Federal ConstitutionallyGuaranteedRights: A Problem of the Independent Interpretation of State Constitutions, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 158, 178-84 (1981)
(recommending "sliding scale scrutiny" for Supreme Court review of state court resolution of
conflicting federal and state rights). But see Peter S. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium On the Resolution in State ConstitutionalLaw,
13 VT. L. REV. 13, 25 (1988) (noting possibility that Court would use "the recent resurgence
in state constitutional law as a justification for lowering the basic floor of [civil liberty] protections available at the national level"). See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, FairMeasure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing constitutional claims which the federal judiciary declines to uphold for such "institutional" concerns as Federalism and judicial competence).
Aid provided through federal assistance programs would be taken into account, and could
be part of the remedy if the state were found in violation. For a critical analysis of attaching
conditions to federal grants to the states, see Kaden, supra note 71, at 893-97.
For an overview of the ways in which human rights law has already affected domestic
jurisprudence, see Kathryn Burke et al., Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law in
State and Federal Courts, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 291 (1983). See generally Farooy Hassan, The
Doctrineof Incorporation: New Vistas for the Enforcement of InternationalHuman Rights?, 5
HUM. RTS. Q. 68, 69 (1983) (suggesting that Tenth Circuit's reliance on international norms in
Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), "usher[ed] in new vistas
for the domestic protection of internationally recognized human rights" through incorporation
into federal common law). See also Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of International
Covenants on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 233 (1985)
("For a country like the United States ....
[t]he domestic enforceability of international
human rights instruments must . . . rest on a theory which makes their enforceability independent of any treaty obligation.").
120. The federal constitution remains supreme law. Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw as
Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1984); cf. The Once "New Judicial
Federalism,"supra note 73, at 6 (arguing that reliance on state law is illegitimate to the extent
it insulates certain constitutional decisions from federal review).
This does not mean that by declaring a provision of the treaty unconstitutional, the
United States could avoid its obligations under international law. RESTATEMENT (REVISED)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 135 cmt. (b) (1986) ("That a
rule of international law or a provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic
law does not relieve the United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a
violation of that obligation."); accord Unites States v. Alvarez-Marchain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196
(1992) (noting that even though U.S. abduction of noncitizen did not violate extradition treaty
and was valid under U.S. law, it may well have been a "violation of general international
law").
121. Such a showing is analogous to the EEOC right-to-sue letter required prior to the
initiation of proceedings in federal court under Title VII, § 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Like the Title VII enforcement mechanisms, state remedies would have to be pursued first.
See generally THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
704-14 (1981); James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive JudicialReview of Economic Regulation Under
State Constitutions: The Casefor Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241 (1981) [hereinafter Kirby,
The Case ForRealism] (arguing that challenges to state economic regulations under the federal
constitution are extremely rare). For a review of developments in substantive due process
under state constitutions, see James C. Kirby, Jr., Expansive JudicialReview of Economic Regulation Under State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
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would be no "federal question." 122 Where there was a preliminary showing that state benefits failed to meet ICESCR's requirements, it would be
the task of the federal court to establish a federal "floor," just as it has
historically set a constitutional "floor." Removal would probably be rare
under this scheme, particularly in view of the traditional federal court
123
deference to "surer-footed" state courts in matters of state law.124
State courts would remain free to articulate a higher standard, reflecting local needs and resources, just as they are free, for example, to
interpret the "equal protection" provisions of their own constitutions to
require more than the same language in the Equal Protection Clause of
the Federal Constitution. 12 5 The leeway built into the Covenant to acsupra note 59, at 94, 110-25. Consideration of the potential roles of administrative agencies in
this scheme is beyond the scope of this Article.
122. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides for Supreme Court review of treaty
applications by the states. This does not preclude limiting review as suggested here. The Constitution explicitly provides that the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts shall be subject
to regulation by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Under my proposal, Congress would
authorize federal jurisdiction where it was claimed that a state failed to meet its minimum
obligations under ICESCR. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
States held to a higher standard than the "federal floor" by their own courts would depend on
the political process, rather than the federal judiciary, for relief.
123. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). See generally David L.
Shapiro, JurisdictionandDiscretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985) (examining judicial discretion stemming from legislative grants and common-law history).
124. For a cogent overview of the tension between "[t]he autonomy principle," which
"licenses state courts as the final, independent arbiters of state law," and "the supremacy principle" which "affirms the primacy of federal law over state law as a basic constraint on state
autonomy," see Note, supra note 77, at 1332. This tension has emerged in a variety of legal
and political contexts, all of which may be instructive for present purposes. Federal courts in
the Lochner era used the due process clause to declare "a wide range of state social and economic legislation ... [void, until] the court jettisoned its earlier doctrines of substantive due
process." Norman Dorsen, State ConstitutionalLaw: An Introductory Survey, 15 CONN. L.
REv.99, 101-02 (1982) (citing as examples West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926), and Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264
U.S. 504 (1924)); see also supra Part I.A.2 (the "New Federalism"); infra notes 129-130 and
accompanying text(Tenth Amendment); cf Kirby, The Casefor Realism, supra note 121 (substantive due process under state constitutions). The common source of these continuing struggles may be found in the original division of responsibilities between the colonial states and the
federal government. See supra Part I.A. 1.
125. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away From a Reactionary
Approach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 1 (1981) (state charters have an important role to play
in the American constitutional process); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466 (1987) [hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism] ("Wherever authorized by its own state constitution, a state government can enact any law not inconsistent with the federal constitution and constitutional federal laws."). See generally Robert C.
Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 59
NOTRE DAME

L. REv. 1118 (1984).
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commodate the demands of cultural relativism in an international con26
text would serve equally well here. 1
As an international treaty ICESCR would not be treated exactly like
state constitutional law with respect to federal statutes enacted after its
ratification. Under one scenario, Congress might enact legislation inconsistent with ICESCR. There has been considerable debate regarding the
status of such statutes. 12 7 It is beyond the scope of this Article to resolve
that debate in this context, but two points are clear. First, it would be
incumbent upon the courts to attempt to reconcile such legislation with
ICESCR, a task facilitated by the Covenant's extremely broad language.
Second, a statute that could not be reconciled with the Covenant would
probably indicate congressional intent to renounce the treaty. To date,
however, none of the parties to ICESCR has withdrawn from the treaty
regime. There is no reason to think that the United States would be the
first to do so.
A second, more likely, scenario involves the enactment of federal
welfare legislation, intended to further ICESCR goals, that interferes
with pre-existing state mechanisms.1 28 A state might contest such legislation on the grounds that it interferes with the state's ability to comply
with ICESCR. A state cannot challenge a federal statute on the ground
that it violates the state's own constitution. It can argue, however, that
such legislation usurps a state function in violation of the Tenth Amendment. 12 9 The extent to which delegation of the Covenant's obligations to
126. See supra note 89 and accompanying text; cf. MOWER, supra note 39, at 9 (citing
argument that "any attempt to develop international norms should be limited to the regional
level, where the higher degree of homogeneity facilitates both the definition and [the] implementation of standards").
127. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1987) (treaties should not be
subordinated to subsequent statutes). But see Weston, Foreign Treaties in U.S. Courts, supra
note 94, at 512 (lawful treaties are "lexically superior to statutes and . . . binding on the
political branches of government").
128. For a careful study and critique of federal-state interaction in connection with one
benefits program, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program:
A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855 (1990). See generally Freudenheim, supra
note 108 at A5 (In response to splintering of national pool into small groups unable to spread
financial risks, many states are requiring insurers to offer all applicants essentially the same
rates.).
129. The feasibility of such a challenge is highly questionable since Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 537-47 (1985) (holding that Congress contravened no affirmative limit on its power under the Commerce Clause by affording the employees
of the public mass-transit authority in San Antonio, Texas protection under the Fair Labor
Standards Act). After changing course four times this century, most recently reversing itself
within a period of nine years, the Court seems to have settled on an approach that debilitates
the Tenth Amendment. Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth Amendment After Garcia: Process-
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the states would affect Congress's power to enact national social welfare
legislation would depend, analogously, on the scope of the delegation.
Framing a delegation provision that neither penalizes states that already
have programs in place nor precludes later federal action would require
careful drafting. Conflicts would ultimately have to be resolved in the
130
federal courts on a case-by-case basis.
B. Implementation of Economic Rights Under This Proposal
The preceding section describes the basic, static framework for integregation of ICESCR. This section will describe how it might actually
operate. Compliance under the integrated system would be promoted
through two basic mechanisms: 1) the preparation and submission of
self-monitoring reports; and 2) the operation of our domestic court sys131
tem, particularly the state courts.
1.

Compliance Mechanisms of ICESCR

The monitoring provisions of the Covenant require the submission
of reports "on the measures which [adhering states] have adopted and
the progress made in achieving the observance of the rights recognized
[therein]." 132 As Professor Alston has noted, "the principal obligation of
Based ProceduralProtections, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1666-67 (1987); see Rapaczynski,
supra note 67 (discussing Federalism after Garcia); Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a Misguided Doctrine, 99 HARV. L. REv. 84
(1985) (arguing that the constraint on congressional power should be abandoned); Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 125, at 1518 ("Congress enjoys no explicit power to
preempt state remedies for unconstitutional federal conduct."). But see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding prior to Garcia that 1974 amendments to Fair
Labor Standards Act were beyond congressional authority so far as they displaced the States'
ability to structure employer-employee relations in areas of traditional governmental
functions).
130. Cf. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-d-Vis the States: The Dispensability of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1591 (1977) (analyzing "[p]olitical branches as
judges of the scope of their own [constitutional] power"). See generally Ann Althouse, How to
Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1485 (1987)
(discussing the situations in which federal courts respect state separateness).
131. Justice Brennan has observed that "[a] truly meaningful implementation of rights
must.., include at least three elements: stability, enforceability, and adaptability." William J.
Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a Charter of
Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1, 4 (1991). Our courts have shown that they can provide
some "stability" and some "enforceability" in connection with economic rights, but they are
hard-pressed to assure all that is needed, or much "adaptability" at all. As described infra
Part II.B.1, ICESCR mechanisms could help compensate for this lacuna in our jurisprudence.
132. ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 16(1). See also Philip Alston, The Purposesof Reporting,
in MANUAL ON HUMAN RiGHTS, supra note 47, at 13 [hereinafter Alston, The Purposes of

Reporting]; John P. Humphrey, The Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights Law, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 31, 37-38 (1978) (discussing the implementation of the Covenant on
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States parties to the Covenant is to implement its provisions at the national level. The obligation to report to an international body . . . is
essentially a means of promoting the implementation of that obligation."' 133 ICESCR contemplates a limitless array of compliance mechanisms, depending on the parties' needs, resources, pre-existing structures,
134
and creativity.

The reporting process promotes domestic implementation in several
ways. 135 First, it fosters the development of a coherent but flexible program. Second, monitoring generates problem-solving measures before
housing or food shortages, for example, become full-blown crises. 136 As
a corollary, monitoring also shifts the burden of production from potential plaintiffs (those who claim a violation of their economic rights) to the
states. The state must affirmatively show that these rights are protected,
rather than requiring the poor-those least able to use the legal system to
their advantage-to prove that they are being denied. Third, the reporting requirement encourages public participation in the process. 37 FiEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights). For a description of the original reporting system, see
MOWER, supra note 39, at 31-46. See also infra note 135 (for sources describing functions
served by reporting); infra note 144 (for sources describing roles of other international agencies
and nongovernmental organizations).
133. Alston, The Purposes of Reporting, supra note 132, at 39. The Committee also uses
the reporting process "to demonstrate a consistency of approach from one report to another."
Id. at 40. This has not always been effective. See Forsythe, supra note 5, at 541 (East Europeans resisted Committee review prior to collapse of Soviet bloc); REBECCA M.M. WALLACE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (1986) (same).
134. "No particular economic or political system is required for the realization of those
rights." Fifth Session Report, supra note 49. The idea of protecting rights through such a
patchwork is familiar to American jurisprudes. For a compelling account of the "myriad ways
in which constitutional 'public law' protections are intricately bound up with-indeed, presuppose-a general backdrop of 'private law' protections defining primary rights of personal property," see Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 125, at 1507. See also Susan P.
Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1411-34 (1991)
(describing models of current remedial decisionmaking).
This flexibility may be particularly apt now. See David E. Rosenbaum, Concern, Cash,
But No Accord on Urban Woes, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1992, at AI (despite continuing absence
of consensus among politicians and academics about "the best ways to lift people out of poverty," "locally organized [programs that] might not be applicable nationwide" are "bright
spots"); see also supra notes 72, 75, 89.
135. See Alston, The Purposes of Reporting, supra note 132, at 13, 14-15 (describing seven
specific functions: initial review, monitoring, policy formulation, public scrutiny, evaluation,
acknowledging problems, and information exchange).
136. See supra note 87, and infra note 165; see generally Lucie E. White, Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearingof Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L.
REV. 1 (1990) (describing oral hearing of a welfare recipient facing a reduction of subsidy).
137. See sources cited supra note 101; Ed Sparer, FundamentalHuman Rights, Legal Entitlements and the Social Struggle: A Friendly Critique of the Legal Studies Movement, 36
STAN. L. REV. 509, 560-67 (1984).
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nally, it enables the states parties to draw upon a global database as well
as the considerable expertise of the Committee itself. Dialogue among
members of different but overlapping communities is crucial at each
138
phase of the process.
A brief description of the salient features of the reporting requirement may clarify how reporting would enable the states to promote economic rights. Article 16 requires the parties to submit "reports on the
measures which they have adopted and the progress made" to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 139 The procedure has been reformed
and the reports are now submitted to the Committee. 14° Under the
guidelines set out in the Fifth Session Report, parties are required to submit a "country profile," including descriptions of the land and people,
general political structure, economic, social and cultural characteristics,
138. See Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the Law and Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129, 130 (1988) ("[C]ommunities are formed and
improved through the promulgation, transformation, and criticism of cultural texts, including
legal texts... it is our texts which.., define, generate and preserve, as well as reflect, shared
community values ....
). The Covenant functions as the "community" text on two discrete
levels, the domestic and the international. It provides the framework through which a country
clarifies and annotates its own text. When a party submits its Report to the Committee, it
joins in "form[ing] and improv[ing]" the international community through the process of interpreting the Covenant. For an insightful application of interpretive theory in the context of
international treaties, see Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371 (1991). See Joseph William Singer, Persuasion, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2442, 2458 (1989) ("[P]ersuasion starts by creating a relationship... mak[ing
people] aware of the connections they already have. The relationship changes who one is...
[and] clarifies what one really thinks. In this way, we may redefine our values."). See generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE, A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson &

Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) (discussing legal and literary theories of interpreting texts). This is
part of the process through which those seeking to implement economic rights generate and
change political discourse. As John Payne observed in connection with the Mt. Laurelaffordable housing litigation:
The lasting achievement of Brown, I believe, was not desegregated schools, but the
stimulus it provided to a public discourse about equality, a discourse that in time
produced the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1965 and 1968. In its more modest compass,
Mount Laurel... is having... a similar effect .... It has... changed the nature of
the discourse and has made it impossible not to think about economic discrimination
as a social problem.
John M. Payne, Title VIII and Mt. Laurel: Is Affordable HousingFairHousing?, 6 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 361, 374 (1988).

139. ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 16(l)-(2).
140. The reports were originally transmitted to the Economic and Social Council. For a
full account of the reasons for the change, and its consequences, see Philip Alston & Bruno
Simma, Second Session Report ofthe U.N. Committee on Economic, Socialand CulturalRights,
82 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 608 (1988). See generally MOWER, supra note 39. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the formation of an independent monitoring organ represented both the acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the original system and a renewed
commitment to economic rights on the part of the U.N.
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and the general legal framework for the protection of human rights. 14 1
Some of this information would be identical for all fifty states and could
be drafted by the federal government. States could file supplemental reports reflecting their particular circumstances. The Covenant does not
specify a reporting scheme for federations and it is not my purpose here
to offer one, except to suggest that any arrangement be devised by the
state governors in consultation with the President. I assume that, except
for the "country profile," each of the fifty states would prepare its own
42

report. 1

The remainder of the report required by Article 16 addresses specific rights. The guideline on the right to food under Article 11, for example, requires parties to prepare a comprehensive study, including "a
general overview of the extent to which the right to adequate food has
been realized in your country... [focusing on] the situation of especially
vulnerable or disadvantaged groups . . .urban poor, children, elderly

143
people, and other especially affected groups."'
144
We already collect much of the data required under ICESCR.
We also convene many of the public hearings and meetings, establish the

141. Fifth Session Report, supra note 49, at 88-89. A "country profile" is similarly required for other international treaties. An objective here, of considerable concern to most
parties, is the reduction of "duplication of information requested by the various treaty bodies."
MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 40. Since the United States is not a party to
many other human rights treaties, this would not be an immediate concern. For a list of the
treaties to which the United States has adhered, see NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 7,
at 400-01.
142. The states could be seen as mini-sovereignties, cooperating as a non-coercive, horizontal system within federalism just as their international counterparts do in the global system.
See generally Note, To Form a More Perfect Union? Federalism and Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 842 (1989) (discussing guidelines promulgated by the National
Association of Attorneys General aiming at reformed cooperation among state governments).
The role of the federal government will be left open. Options include a separate report, with or
without a synthesis of the state reports. Cf.Canadian Report, supra note 115; Turp, supra note
115, at 465.
The federal government could also assume a mediating or coordinating role to address
concerns among states, such as the "influx of the needy" from neighboring states. Cf Steward,
Madison's Nightmare, supra note 106, at 337 (characterizing federal government as a "command and control" system). See generally PAUL E. PETERSON & MARK C. ROM, WELFARE
MAGNETS:

A

NEW CASE FOR

A

NATIONAL STANDARD

(1990) (discussing state welfare sys-

tems and the establishment of a national welfare standard); Richard B. Steward, Federalism
and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 975-79 (1985) (urging a system of "horizontal income transfers" among states and localities, the recipients to be given broad discretion with respect to
their use).
143. MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 60.
144. In addition to federal and state information gathering machinery, international agencies and nongovernmental organizations might be helpful. For an in-depth discussion of the
roles of the International Labour Organization and other U.N. specialized agencies in implementing ICESCR, see MOWER, supra note 39, at 67-143.
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task forces, prepare the studies, and in general do much of what ICESCR
requires. This would make our task that much easier. Nevertheless, we
do not carry out these functions with much consistency. Liberals point
to the deteriorating standard of living of the poor to argue that we do not
do enough. 14 5 Conservatives cite the gains of the black middle class 14 6
and recent election returns, and retort that we already do (and spend)
more than we should. Those eschewing a liberal-conservative dichotomy1 47 suggest (with growing exasperation) that we should do neither
more nor less of what we have been doing, but consider something else
entirely.
It is difficult to move beyond polemics without a coherent framework in which to assess the problem. A major function of the reporting
process is to provide a real sense of the overall impact of our efforts. The
Covenant does not require onerous centralized planning, and the Committee recognizes that an ad hoc, responsive system may be quite effective. Coordination and accountability are essential, however. A major
purpose of reporting is to help a nation achieve both.14 8
Each party is supposed to submit its first report within two years of
ratification and at five-year intervals thereafter. 149 In order to assure
public involvement in the preparation of a report, each party is required
to describe the manner and extent of public dissemination of ICESCR
and to state whether "its content has been the subject of public
debate." 5 0
145. See supra note 26.
146. See Study Finds Gainsfor Black Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1991 at A25
(reporting that proportion of affluent blacks-those with family incomes greater than
$50,000-doubled in the 1980s, although poor, largely urban blacks remain socially and economically isolated from the American mainstream); see also Isabel Wilkerson, Middle-class
Blacks Try to Grip a Ladder While Lending a Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1990, at Al.
147. See, eg., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:
Moderation as a Postmodern CulturalForm, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707 (1991).
148. For a thoughtful vision of a welfare system of relative legal informality, decentralized
enforcement structure, and greater professionalism among caseworkers, see William H. Simon,
Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983).
149. Philip Alston, The InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights,
in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 39, 40 [hereinafter Alston, ICESCR]. For
a description of the parties' recalcitrance in the early rounds of reporting, see Forsythe, supra
note 5.
150. Fifth Session Report,supra note 49, at 89. See supra note 101. See generally Howard
Tolley, Jr., PopularSovereignty and InternationalLaw: ICJStrategiesfor Human Rights StandardSetting, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 561 (1989) (discussing techniques by which a nongovernmental
organization can influence national governments to adopt international law and procedures
tending to limit state power).
Discussions among Committee members and country representatives give governments
another perspective on domestic problems. Tikhonov Interview, supra note 21; cf. Hormats,
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The reports are submitted to the Committee, which meets with
country representatives after its review. During this meeting, which is
open to the public, the Committee typically asks for further information
or clarification. 15 1 The meeting usually ends with comments by Committee members.1 52 The aim is neither to censure 153 nor to sanction, but to
enable each party to better achieve its own objectives. This final step in
the process becomes the first stage in the next cycle. A reporting country
not only benefits from the Committee's expertise but adds to it, contributing its own experience and innovations. Under the recently adopted
Guidelines, countries are asked to note any measures specifically undertaken pursuant to ICESCR's mandate.' 54 This should facilitate domestic
as well as international assessments of ICESCR's usefulness.
2. Economic Rights in Domestic Courts

Much of our domestic litigation on economic rights, on both state
and federal levels, has grappled with the very existence of such rights. 155
Ratification of the Covenant would affirmatively and conclusively resolve
that issue. Even more of our domestic litigation has plunged us into the
quagmire of implementation. Many of these cases would similarly be
pre-empted by the ICESCR mechanisms described in the preceding section. What would remain for our courts? What additional burdens
would be placed on them? Would our traditional jurisprudence suffice?
If not, what would replace or supplement it?156
supra note 38, at 148 ("[New economic] goals should be established through a dialogue between the president, Congress and the nation's governors... after a focused public discussion
involving the private sector.").
151. Countries are accordingly encouraged to send knowledgeable experts to these meetings. Tikhonov Interview, supra note 21.
152. Fausto Pocar & Bernard, NationalReports: Their Submission to Expert Bodies and
Follow-Up, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 25, 26.
153. The Committee indicates when a report, or the activity reported, fails to satisfy
ICESCR. Tikhonov Interview, supra note 21; see also Zayas, supra note 114, at 304
("[D]iscussions have been serious, well-focused, and non-political... [and] the Committee has
encouraged but not pressured states parties."). For an example of relatively vigorous questioning, see Third Session Report, supra note 49, at 34 (France questioned about right to housing).
154. The Committee also prepares "general comments" which are not limited to specific
countries. As set forth in Annex III of the Third Session Report, "The committee endeavors,
through its general comments, to make the experience gained so far through the examination
of these reports available for the benefit of all States parties in order to assist and promote their
further implementation." Third Session Report, supra note 49, at 87.
155. See federal cases cited supra note 11. For state cases, see Neuborne, State Constitutions, supra note 70, at 895-98 nn.83, 86, 87 & 94-96; Note, supra note 77; Galie, supra note
118, at 114-20.
156. See generally Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Transformation or Adoption of International
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These questions can only be definitively answered over time, by the
courts themselves. The following section discusses some of the factors
they might consider. The focus is on state courts, where most cases
would be litigated, but much of the discussion is equally applicable to
federal courts.1 57 First, I set forth the courts' basic options and suggest
how they might decide among them. Second, I explain how certain key
norms of the Covenant would probably be interpreted under traditional
rights analysis.
a. Traditional Rights Analysis and Economic Rights
Justiciability is an open question under the Covenant.158 Under the
proposal here, it would be decided on a case-by-case basis in state
courts. 159 A state court would have three basic options when presented
with a claim for economic rights.' 6° One, it could adjudicate the case.
Two, it could defer to existing ICESCR mechanisms-such as administrative agencies or task forces-or even order the parties to devise an
appropriate mechanism. Three, it could combine the first two by structuring dual roles for itself and the ICESCR process, referring the matter
for agency action while retaining jurisdiction or bifurcating the proceeding. This threshold decision should take into account the strengths and
weaknesses of traditional rights analysis in the context of economic
rights.
Traditional rights analysis has often been a dead end for economic
rights. While it is easy to overstate the distinction between positive and
Law into MunicipalLaw, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 88 (1963) (discussing this transformation in
Germany and Austria).
157. This is not to suggest that federal and state court jurisdiction are coterminous in this
context. See supra text accompanying notes 119-124. See generally KENNETH C. RANDALL,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs PARADIGM 102-26 (1990)

(discussing U.S. civil litigation involving human rights violations and terrorist acts committed
outside the United States).
158. Cf.A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV.873, 873-74, 916-23 (1976) (describing large body of state constitutional law dealing with public education). But see Fifth Session Report, supra note 49, at 84
(suggesting that articles dealing with the right to an education, among others, "would seem to
be capable of immediate application by judicial organs"). See generally sources cited infra
notes 162, 164, 166.
159. The standard for review of a determination by the highest state court that a particular
claim was not justiciable could be the same as the standard for review of a decision on the
merits, i.e., that it violated ICESCR. See supra text accompanying notes 119-124.
160. I attempt no more here than a delineation of functional alternatives. See supra note
43. For a fully developed theoretical analysis, see Sturm, supra note 134, at 1359 (suggesting
"a normative framework to guide the practice and evaluation of the evolving public remedial
practice").
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negative rights, 16 1 it remains far simpler for courts to prohibit than to
prescribe. Even where an affirmative obligation is specific and discrete,
courts may be reluctant to order relief. When they do, the result is often
62
a judicial nightmare, as exemplified by the school desegregation cases.1
Even after a standard is articulated and remedial measures drafted
(both of which may take years), some kind of ongoing participation in
the implementation process is necessary. 163 Courts are plainly unsuited
for this function. 164 They were never intended to serve in ongoing supervisory roles, and they generally lack the resources, institutional support,
and expertise to do so. Reliance on the judiciary to implement economic
rights also imposes an enormous burden on plaintiffs, who must continually apply to the courts for enforcement and revision of existing orders. 165 Some commentators have suggested that economic rights
166
litigation may even be self-defeating.
161. The fallacies of the negative and positive rights dichotomy have been ably demonstrated by other commentators. See supra note 9. Most critics focus on the affected rightsholder. It makes no difference to a poor woman, for example, whether she is unable to obtain
an abortion because of legal prohibition or because she cannot afford one. Cf. Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978) (describing "victim" versus
"perpetrator" perspectives in the context of antidiscrimination law).
162. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). State courts have found
themselves in a similar morass. See, e.g, Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975). For an
illuminating analysis of some of the difficulties, see Peter M. Shane, School DesegregationRemedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041 (1984).
163. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Rule ofLaw and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration,56 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 779 (1990) (explaining why legislators who endorse substantive welfare rights might not create effective enforcement mechanisms); Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976) (arguing that
the traditional conception of civil litigation as dispute resolution between private parties fails
to account for the increasing number of statutory and constitutional issues being decided in
civil cases).
164. ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE 227-35 (1989) (case study of judicial supervision of school desegregation). See generally MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS:

AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL

(1982); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOPOLICY 297-98 (1977) (there is a limit to the institutional capacity of courts to effectuate
social policy).
165. There is also always the question of meaningful access to the courts. See, e.g., Herbert A. Hirte, Access to the Courtfor Indigent Persons: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal
Framework in the United Kingdom, United States and Germany, 40 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 91
(1991) (discussing difficulties encountered by indigents in their efforts to gain access to the
courts). See generally Talbot D'Alemberte, Alexis de Tocqueville, Atticus Finch, and Legal
Services for the Poor in the Nineties, 7 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (1991) (discussing unequal
access to the judicial system).
166. See, e.g, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (discussing the role of
courts in desegregation litigation); Freeman, supra note 161; Raneta J. Lawson, The Child
POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY
CIAL
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Notwithstanding the patent inadequacies of rights discourse in this
context, 167 it retains an undeniable cachet. Professor Sylvia Law has
pointed out that "[o]urs is a culture that values rights, and poor people
share the values of our culture ....Vulnerable people have good reason
to prefer the harder edge of rights to the hope that others whose lives are
very different will be able to empathize with them."16 On the international level, ICESCR's proponents have similarly insisted that the Covenant be treated with the same deference accorded ICCPR, 169 which
guarantees the "liberal" rights, such as the right to a fair trial and free-

dom of speech, familiar to us from our own Bill of Rights. 170 Although
it has always been understood that economic rights do not fit precisely
into the same mold as civil and political rights, ICESCR's advocates
have argued that the Covenant would be debased were it subject to a less
71
demanding standard.1
There are also more tangible reasons for the persistent appeal of

rights, apparent in our own state constitutional jurisprudence. The
rights analysis historically employed by state courts in adjudicating economic rights is more muscular than ICESCR's general mandates. Similarly situated persons must be treated similarly, under the equal
protection guarantees of most state constitutions. 172 If the law confers a
Seated Next to Me: The Continuing Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 35, 54 (1990).

167. See generally Becker, supra note 39; Amy Bartholomew & Alan Hunt, What's Wrong
with Rights?, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 1 (1990).

168. Sylvia A. Law, Some Reflections on Goldberg v. Kelly at Twenty Years, 56 BROOK. L.
REV. 805, 816 (1990). See also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991).
169. See supra notes 5, 9; infra text accompanying note 171; Limburg Principles,supra

note 3, at 123.
170. Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, First Session of the U.N.Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, 81 AM. J.INT'L L. 747, 747 n.5 (1987) [hereinafter Alston &
Simma, First Session]; see also Theo Van Boven, Address at the Opening of the Third Committee of the GeneralAssembly at its Thirty-Second Session Sept. 28, 1977, in PEOPLE MATTER:
VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 16 (1982). For a forceful argument on
the need to work for both types of rights in the United States, see Sparer, supra note 137.
171. See U.N. GAOR, 3rd Comm., 6th Sess., 358th-72d, 411th mtgs. at 67, 67-150, 399499, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/SR.358-72, A/C.3/SR.411-17 (1951-1952). The decision resulting
from these debates is contained in the Report of the Third Committee, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda Item 29, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/2112 (1952), cited in David M. Trubeck, Economic, Social and CulturalRights in the Third World: Human Rights Law andHuman Rights
Programs, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 205,
211 n. 17 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); see also A.M. Capotori, Human Rights: The HardRoad
Towards Universality, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE, AND THEORY 986, 989 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas
M. Johnston eds., 1983).
172. While equal protection is probably the most useful provision for those claiming eco-
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benefit on one group, it may not arbitrarily deny that benefit to another
group. Benefits may not be denied without due process of law. 173 Once a
court determines that a claimant's right to a particular benefit is "fundamental," the court will "strictly scrutinize" any state action 174 affecting
that entitlement. The state must show that it has a compelling interest in
the proposed measure and that it cannot be achieved by less restrictive
75

means.1

nomic rights in state courts, it does not always trigger strict scrutiny in this context. See Note,
Intermediate Equal ProtectionScrutiny of Welfare Laws that Deny Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 1547, 1547 (1984). Nor have efforts to expand it generally been successful. See, e.g.,
Hogin, supra note 87, at 57-64.
173. This parallels federal constitutional jurisprudence. Due process has been held to require notice and a hearing before termination of benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261-63 (1970); Brest, FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival, supra note 101, at 1627-28; cf.
Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L.
REv. 731, 733 (1990) (arguing "that in a centrally managed economy .. .the due process
clause gives every person in America a constitutional right to minimum subsistence and housing, to child care, education, employment, health insurance, retirement, and to a clean and
healthy natural environment"). The Goldberg court was inspired, in part, by Professor Reich's
articles, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), and Individual Rights and Social Welfare: Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965), both cited in the decision, Goldberg,
397 U.S. at 262 n.8, 265 n.13. But see Epstein, No New Property,supra note 32, at 749 (termination of welfare benefits should not be subject to due process constraints on the ground that
such benefits are "property"); Paul R. Verkuil, Revisiting the New PropertyAfter Twenty-Five
Years, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365 (1990) (criticizing the "Reichian" approach as ignoring
the societal imperative to ration resources).
174. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). See generally Paul A. Freund, The State Action Problem, in Symposium on Human Rights in the United States, 135 PROC. AM. PHIL. Soc'Y 3 (1991); Comment, State Court Approaches to the State Action Requirement: Private Rights, Public Values,
and ConstitutionalChoices, 39 KAN. L. REV. 495 (1991); James M. Dolliver, The Washington
Constitution and "State Action". The View of the Framers, 22 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 445
(1986).
Whether non-state action would be considered under the Covenant is an open question. It
should be noted that activities of "private" citizens providing for their own needs are routinely
taken into account. See, e.g., Second Session Report, supra note 49, at 17 (construction of
residences by private citizens in Mongolia); id. at 21 (visits by priests to the sick in Romania).
State support of such private efforts is also regularly taken into account. But see Stark, Nurturing Rights, supra note 41, at 151 (women's work in the private sphere is generally not considered). See generally Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human
Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 51 (1992) (discussing human rights instruments that affirm
individual duties). For an argument against rigid "state action" analysis in the state constitutional context, see David M. Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine:
A Fundamental Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221 (1985).
175. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking one year residency
requirement as violative of Equal Protection Clause after finding no compelling state interest);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (if a statute significantly interferes with the exercise
of a fundamental right, it must be supported by sufficiently important state interests and be
closely tailored to effectuate only those interests); see also Martha I. Morgan, Fundamental
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In Tucker v. Toia, 176 for example, the key to the New York court's
decision was its characterization of the right to subsistence as "fundamental to the relationship between the individual and the State." 177 The
court applied traditional rights analysis to the "fundamental" right that
it had identified, and held that an amendment to the state constitution
restricting those benefits was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
standard. Finding that no compelling state interest was served by distinguishing between needy children living with relatives "enumerated"
under an independent federal statute (to whom the amendment did not
apply), and those not living with such relatives (to whom it did), the
court held that the amendment also violated state equal protection requirements.1 78 Because the right in issue was fundamental,179 moreover,
the court held that it could not be abrogated by the state even if there
was a "fiscal emergency." 1 80 The Tucker holding must be credited not
only to the substantive provision of the New York constitution, but to
the vigorous constitutional framework in which such provisions are ana181
lyzed as well.
Finally, and critically, traditional rights analysis permits courts to
play a countermajoritarian role. Economic rights, like civil and political
rights, may clash with the will of the majority, or the public officials who
represent it. As the Tucker court observed, "It is the essential character
of constitutional documents and the rights they secure to be immune
from the expediency which often recommends the infringement of indiState Rights: A New Basis for Strict Scrutiny in FederalEqual Protection Review, 17 GA. L.
REv. 77 (1982).
176. 390 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
177. Id. at 799. For a discussion of the methods used by state courts to determine whether
a right is fundamental, see Morgan, supra note 175, at 96-102.
178. Tucker, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
179. For a description of the contexts in which state courts have applied strict scrutiny
based on a finding of a fundamental right, see Galie, supra note 118, at 101-04. See also supra
text accompanying note 177.
180. Tucker, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 803. In doing so, the court upheld language remarkably
similar to that of the Covenant. The extension of benefits may well have been disallowed
under ICESCR's "maximum available resources" standard. Similarly, if the provision relied
on in Tucker had been a mere statute, rather than part of the state constitution, it would have
been harder to extend benefits to those denied them by operation of the amendment. The court
probably would have had to concede the state's fiscal emergency argument, assuming it could
be proved.
181. As Judge Jon Newman has pointed out, once a liberty or property interest has been
"authoritatively defined by state courts, [it] become[s] subject to fourteenth amendment protection against deprivation without due process of law." Jon 0. Newman, The "Old Federalism'" Protection of Individual Rights by State Constitutions in an Era of Federal Court
Passivity, 15 CONN. L. Rv. 21, 27 (1982) (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

vidual rights in response to the crisis of the hour."' 182 This is particularly
critical for the poor, who usually lack meaningful access to the political
process. At the same time, remedies for economic rights often require
some kind of expenditure, which is difficult to obtain through judicial
edict. Efforts to do so may well backfire.
Traditional rights analysis, invaluable at some stages in establishing
economic rights, may be less useful or even counterproductive at others.
Nancy Fraser suggests a continuum for analyzing economic rights, or
"needs claims," ranging from " 'thin' needs such as food or shelter simpliciter" to "thick" needs; "What specific forms of provision are implied
once we acknowledge... very general, thin needs?" 8 3 Traditional rights
analysis can quite effectively compel the initial acknowledgement of
"thin" needs, both symbolically and in terms of broad resource
allocation.
Its utility diminishes progressively, however, as the issues get
"thicker." Even where enforcement is feasible, due process essentially
only provides procedural safeguards and equal protection only guarantees benefits equal to those received by others "similarly situated."
Neither assures a substantive standard nor provides a method for formulating one. While the Tucker court expressly referred to a "minimal level
of health, nutrition and security," 184 this language provides little foothold for subsequent suits brought on that ground.
Domestic courts might use Fraser's continuum to decide whether,
or how much, to rely on ICESCR. Adjudication would be appropriate in
cases involving "thin" claims while deferral to ICESCR mechanisms
would be more appropriate where "thick" claims were raised, because
ICESCR is more conducive to problem-solving and consensus building.
The process gives all those with an interest in the outcome the opportunity to air their objections and to co-opt each other.1 85
182. 390 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
183. Nancy Fraser, Talking About Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in
Welfare State Societies, 99 ETHICS 291, 292-93 (1989). Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword:
State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63
TEX. L. REV. 959, 974-85 ("Questions of abstract morality are by nature general and enduring. In contrast, questions of instrumental strategy are sensitive to elements in their target
environment, and hence highly variable."). See generally THE RIGHT TO FOOD (Philip Alston
& Katarina Tomasevski eds., 1984).
184. 390 N.Y.S.2d at 805 (emphasis added). Cf.JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS:

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL

DECLARATION OF

HUMAN RIGHTS 51-52 (1987) (arguing that "minimally... good li[ves]" should be the focus
of human rights). See generally infra text accompanying notes 188, 202, 206.
185. For those conversant with the methods and rhetoric of alternative dispute resolution,
much of this will seem familiar. This should not be surprising, since ADR has its genesis in
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Considerable litigation on "thin" questions should be pre-empted by
ICESCR's unambiguous articulation of basic rights. Much, if not most,
of the remaining caseload would probably involve or eventually reach
some "thick" questions. These might be addressed through bifurcated
proceedings, drawing on the respective strengths of ICESCR and tradi18 6
tional rights analysis.
b. Norms of the Covenant
This section considers the interpretation of two specific ICESCR
norms by domestic courts: One, the requirement that the rights set out
in ICESCR be enjoyed without discrimination, 18 7 and two, the affirmation of a "minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the
very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights."1 88 Both of
these norms would probably be considered justiciable by domestic courts.
international law. See generally ROGER FISHER, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT FOR BEGINNERS
(1969); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM J. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

(Saadia Touval & I. William Zartman eds., 1985); WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988); Richard B.
Bilder, International Third Party Dispute Settlement, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 471
(1989); United Nations: Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes Between States, 30
I.L.M. 229 (1991); Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 30 I.L.M. 384 (1991).
186. This contemplates multi-level and even overlapping efforts, rather than a neat bifurcation of responsibility. Cf. Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering
for the Poor,56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863 (1990) (The Kelly decision, "[r]ather than dictating a
single, authoritative meaning to a passive audience ... seems to invite readers to bring their
own creativity into an open-ended, deeply pluralistic project of 'authorship' of our constitutional norms."). See generally Leopold Pospisil, Legal Levels andMultiplicityof Legal Systems
in Human Societies, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2 (1967).
In some circumstances, a court could probably provide adequate coordination for this
"pluralistic project." In the Mount LaurelII litigation, for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court appointed three judges to oversee the implementation of its affordable housing mandate.
While this scheme was ultimately superseded by the enactment of the Fair Housing Act, its
abandonment was a function of the political process. Many local politicians in effect criticized
the judicial administration for being all too competent. See John M. Payne, Housing Rights
andRemedies: A "Legislative" History of Mount Laurel II, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 889, 92732 (1986).
This is not to underestimate the real risks, especially to vulnerable populations, of ad hoe
coordination, or delegation, without appropriate accountability. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 194-203 (1989) (failure of social services agency to protect child where six
separate incidents of child abuse were reported was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because state had no affirmative obligation to protect child from "private actor," i.e., his father). Ratification of ICESCR under the scheme sketched here would arguably impose such
an affirmative obligation.
187. ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 2(2).
188. MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 45 (text of general comment 3, para.
10).
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Under the analysis suggested in the preceding section, both involve "thin
needs" claims and are therefore well-suited to judicial action, at least in
the first instance. Both, moreover, have been addressed extensively in
state constitutional jurisprudence.
Assuming a court asserted jurisdiction over a case raising either of
these norms, 18 9 how would it then proceed? While our courts would certainly be free to draw upon the reasoning of foreign courts, 190 they would
not be bound by other countries' interpretations of the Covenant. 191 The
precise legal significance of the Committee's Report, including its Commentary, would be an open question. 192 Domestic courts are already
bound by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 193 however,
which provides in part that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."' 194 The
189. Even if "adjudication is not interpretation," as asserted in the title of Robin West's
article, see Robin L. West, Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About the
Law-as-LiteratureMovement, 54 TENN. L. REV. 203, 203 (1987), there is a persuasive counterargument that "[i]nterpretation is a central feature of adjudication of any sort," Paul Brest,
Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 767 (1982). For a discussion of the interpretive function in the treaty context, see Johnstone, supra note 138.
190. See Rosenbaum, supra note 40, at 111 ("Legal services' objectives can be enhanced
through the use of international law in domestic legal arenas."). The Committee has begun to
request information from the parties as to ICESCR's application in their domestic courts.
This should help make foreign decisions more readily available. But see Implementation of the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR 58th Sess.,
17625th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. E/1986/4/Add.21 (1986) (Norway's report). Since Norwegian
law is more specific than the Covenant, the international instrument is not relied on. In Sweden, similarly, the more detailed Swedish law is cited and ICESCR has not even been enacted
domestically. See Second Session Report, supra note 49, at 26-27.
191. But see Jackson, supra note 96, at 327 (considering argument that "international interpretations [of a treaty] are binding on the domestic legal institutions, including the courts").
A concern for autonomy, or "local control," on the interstate as well as intrastate level,
somewhat paradoxically appears to be universal. See, e.g., supra note 66; LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (Philip Mawhood ed., 1983); Libonati, supra note 72, at 55
(describing the "rediscovery of the values of decentralization of power and localism in [former]
socialist bloc countries").
192. See Brudner, supra note 119; see also Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International
Human Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (1981).
To the extent that Committee Reports purport to set forth customary law, their pronouncements would probably be accepted as authoritative. A review of the Reports, however, indicates that the Committee does not claim to do so very often. As Alston, Quinn, and others
have noted, the jurisprudence of economic rights is not as developed on the municipal level as
the jurisprudence of civil and political rights. Alston & Quinn, Nature and Scope of Parties'
Obligations,supra note 9, at 183-84. There is, accordingly, considerably less of a consensus on
which to build. See generally Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary InternationalLaw:
The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 211 (1991).
193. HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 5, at 387.
194. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 42, art. 31.
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Committee's Reports should arguably be accepted as authoritative clarification of the Covenant's "object and purpose." 195 Our courts are also,
of course, bound by international law. 196 The Committee's declaration
that the prohibition against discrimination is not subject to the "progressive realization" standard is consistent with established international
97

norms. 1

Domestic courts would retain considerable discretion to shape
emerging economic rights.198 Neither international law nor ICESCR itself requires that its norms be construed in accordance with our own
195. See Eduardo Jim6nez de Ar~ehaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century,
159 RECUEIL DES COuRS D'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 9, 42-48
(1978); Limburg Principles,supra note 3; supra text accompanying notes 47-49, 148-150. See
generally Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretationfrom a Negotiator's Perspective, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1988); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., THE INTERPRETATION
OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
196. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899). The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Alvarez-Machain seems to be inconsistent with this hitherto well-established rule. See supra
note 120. Since the Court prudently limited its holding to the scope of the extradition treaty, it
may be inferred that it still considers The PaqueteHabanadecision good law. "International
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for
their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controllingexecutive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). The Court's failure to
apply international law in Alvarez-Machain may be attributed to either a "controlling executive act" or, inexplicably, because of some imagined dearth of customary law on point.
In the alternative, it may be argued that the Court has made a grievous error, as Professor
Henkin persuasively suggests:
During its past term, the U.S. Supreme Court had one of its infrequent opportunities to take international law seriously and to assure that the Executive Branch
takes international law seriously. The Supreme Court failed... Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is hard to believe; "monstrous," dissenting Justice Stevens called it
....
The judicial-executive distortion of standard extradition treaties is remediable,
and our treaty partners will no doubt find their remedies. In reaction to general
outrage, the United States will-at least-have to disown that interpretation if it is to
maintain its network of extradition treaties, as important to the United States as to
any state in the world.
Louis Henkin, Will the U.S. Supreme Court Fail InternationalLaw?, NEWSLETTER (Amer.
Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 1, 1.
197.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 702 cmt n & rep. note 10 (1986). Indeed, the norm against racial discrimination is
one of a handful of "peremptory [universal] norms" generally acknowledged under international law. Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, supra note 195, at 64. See also E.V.O. Dankwa & Cees
Flinterman, Commentary by the Rapporteurson the Nature andScope of States Parties'Obligations, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 136, 141-42 (1987) (nondiscrimination).
198. With respect to state constitutional jurisprudence, it has been suggested that state
courts consider four factors when interpreting state court constitutions. We may dispense with
the first, "similarity of the state and federal provisions" since there is only one text, the Covenant, to be considered here. The three remaining are pertinent: one, the "[e]xistence of state
precedents"; two, "[u]nique local conditions"; and three, the "position taken by the United
STATES,
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constitutional jurisprudence. As discussed above, however, because of
both the historic domestic treatment of economic rights (once they are
recognized as rights) and the international insistence that economic
rights be accorded the same status as civil and political rights, domestic
courts would probably locate these particular ICESCR norms within our
constitutional framework.
The particular situs of a norm within that framework would remain
an open question. Unlike the federal and some state constitutions, for
example, ICESCR does not textually distinguish between gender and racial discrimination. White women might rely upon this to challenge legislation under which they were held to a different standard than people of
color. 199 It is arguable, however, that ICESCR triggers something less
than "strict scrutiny." While remaining within constitutional parameters, courts could hold that the Covenant merely requires that a state
have a "rational basis" for discriminating among groups in the provision
of economic rights. 2°° This would leave the states free to impose a higher
20 1
standard of scrutiny for racial discrimination.
States Supreme Court." Johansen, Toward a PrincipledInterpretation,supra note 73, at 31819.
199. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. See also Burke et al., supra note 119, at 326-27. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624-25 (1986) (heightened scrutiny would be
called for only if it were clear that women's interests were politically "undervalued").
Pitting one disadvantaged group against another is among the most disturbing consequences of applying traditional rights analysis to entitlement issues. Again, ICESCR mechanisms provide a safety valve, an alternative to a "zero-sum game," a way of mediating
competition for always-limited resources. See JOHN S. MURRAY ET AL., PROCESSES OF DIsPUTE RESOLUTION 102-08 (1989).
200. For example, it could still be argued that there was a "rational basis" for distinguishing between subsidizing child birth and subsidizing abortion. Under the right to health set out
in Article 12, however, a woman seeking funding for an abortion would have an important
additional ground for argument. See Rebecca J. Cook, InternationalProtection of Women's
Reproductive Rights, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 645, 719-26 (1992).
201. While it is obviously impossible to predict the Committee's reaction to hypothetical
U.S. court decisions, international consensus on gender discrimination is notably problematic.
For a comprehensive and insightful analysis, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 621-34, 638-43 (1991). See generally
Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1991); Rebecca J. Cook, InternationalHuman
Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes and Comments, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 779
(1990); Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990). Prohibitions against racial
discrimination, in contrast, are generally recognized as customary international law, even peremptory norms. See, e.g., supra note 197 and accompanying text; Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES 15, 15-17 (Hurst Hannum ed., 1989).
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The situs of the right to subsistence would raise similar issues.
Again, a domestic court would probably place the right somewhere in
our constitutional framework. If the Commentary were deemed binding,
or if the court found it persuasive, some or all of the cluster of subsistence rights might be considered "fundamental rights.1 20 2 As Tucker v.
Toia demonstrated, such rights may not be abrogated. Not even New
York's "fiscal emergency" excused it from providing benefits fundamen20 3
tal to the relationship of the citizen to the state.
This leads to the sensitive question of state spending under
ICESCR. 2°4 The Covenant does not explicitly require expenditures.
Rather, the question under ICESCR is one of the allocation of "the maximum of available resources.1 205 The issue would not be whether a court
could order state spending, but the circumstances under which a courtordered shift in resource allocation would be justified. As the Commentary makes clear, however, even extremely poor countries are expected to
meet the subsistence needs of their inhabitants. 20 6 A U.S. claim of "inadequate resources" would likely meet with considerable skepticism on the
part of the Committee. This issue would most constructively be addressed on a practical, case-by-case basis, rather than as an abstraction.
Here, again, the courts and the parties might profit by ICESCR mechanisms, both to address the "thicker" questions involved in setting priorities and to defuse political tensions by promoting full discussion and
cooperative problem-solving among affected groups.
202. In the alternative, the court could find such rights equivalent to "liberty" or "property" interests. For a critical analysis of federal court efforts to determine whether a deprivation of life, liberty or property has occurred when government benefits are denied, see Stephen
F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3

(1983).
203. 390 N.Y.S.2d. 794, 799 (S.Ct.), af'd, 371 N.E.2d 449 (N.Y. 1977).
204. This question is sensitive not only because of the specter of increased taxes, but because it may put that possibility beyond the direct control of the legislature, tilting the balance
of power under federalism. The constitutional limitation on domestic courts' power to require
legislative expenditures is unsettled. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (court "could
have authorized or required [school] district to levy property taxes at rate adequate to fund
desegregation remedy; [however] remedial powers of equity.., are not unlimited... [and the
court must respect the] function of local government institutions"); see Ron Combs, Note,
Schoolbooks In the MissouriRiver? A PossibleResponse to Missouri v. Jenkins, 56 Mo. L. Rav.
389 (1991). The tension here reflects the conflict between majoritarian and
countermajoritarian norms in the context of the spending power, historically entrusted to a
majoritarian political process. If countermajoritarian norms are accepted as "rights," however, the balance shifts. If the majority becomes persuaded that it benefits by assuring subsistence, of course, these norms lose their countermajoritarian character. See supra note 161.
205.

ICESCR, supra note 1, art. 2(l) (emphasis added).

206. Fifth Session Report, supra note 49, at 45.
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Conclusion
There is core compatibility between state constitutions and
ICESCR. This was fostered by the "New Federalism," which has increased the states' responsibility for the basic welfare of their inhabitants.
Ratification of ICESCR would facilitate and expedite a progression that
is not only increasingly urgent but perhaps already inevitable.
At the same time, ratification would allow us to assume a constructive new role in international affairs. 20 7 The collapse of the Soviet Union
leaves us with no excuse for snubbing ICESCR. Nor can we afford to
stand aloof if we want to participate fully in the European Community
and other global markets. 20 8 Ratifying ICESCR would reassure the rest
of the world that we have basic values in common. 20 9 It would also enable us to contribute to the development of international law. American
notions of due process and equal protection would bring new rigor to
international conceptions of economic rights.
Our domestic experience with evolving economic rights has been
frustrating. As Professor Panjabi reminds us, "Western civilization did
not leap in one bound from Locke to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Centuries of adjustment, tension, compromise, resistance, re-evaluation, and structuring were required to bring about the cur207. As Alston correctly noted, this cannot be the major ground for urging adherence.
Alston, Need for an Entirely New Strategy, supra note 17, at 393. Neither, however, should
the United States ignore the consequences of non-ratification.
208. There can be no serious doubt that such participation is critical to our economic wellbeing, if not survival. See, e.g., David Gergen, America's Missed Opportunities, 71 FOREIGN
AFF. Winter 1991-1992, at 16 ("Over 40 percent of U.S. economic growth in the past four
years ... [is] attributable to increases in U.S. exports.").
209. For more theoretical justifications for ratification, see Jerome J. Shestack, The Jurisprudence of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 69, 75-101 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984). While we would incur no direct
responsibilities by ratification, participation in the ICESCR process could also lead us to reconsider the nature of our obligations toward the rest of the world. "As is not the case with
civil-political rights, however, another state can help give effect to some economic-social rights
... without forcible intervention, merely by financial aid to the local government." HENKIN,
THE AGE OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 45; cf.Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (discussing the evolution of the U.S. tradition of predicating constitutional rights on "membership" in the domestic polity, and alternatives to that model in an
international context). But see Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalizationof Human Rights,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 588 ("economic rights are especially unsuitable for international
protection by one state against another or by the international community as a whole"). See
generally Dominguez, Assessing Human Rights Conditions, in ENFORCING GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS

(1979);

JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

162-202 (1989); MOWER, supra note 39, at 145-80 (discussing "global efforts to [address] problem of available resources"); NICKEL, supra note 184, at 120-30; Kai Nielsen, On the Need to
Politicize Political Morality: World Hunger and Moral Obligation, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 253 (J. Rolland Penock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
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rent sense of commitment. ' 210 From this perspective, the achievements
of the Covenant regime in its brief existence are astounding. Recent
Committee reports 2 11 suggest, moreover, that it is getting into high
gear. 212 If we are concerned about meeting the needs of our own people,
there is no better guide than ICESCR and the procedures established by
2 13
the Committee.
There is far more to learn and to gain from participation in ICESCR
than administrative techniques or analytical tools. As the United States
considers the awesome responsibilities of world leadership, we would do
well to ask ourselves where it is we hope to lead. The text of the Covenant provides normative guidance, and through the ICESCR process we
could contextualize evolving norms and give them substance. As a Committee member once remarked, "[T]he amount of assistance provided to
the disadvantaged in society is considered a good measure of civilization
.
"...,214 Eleanor Roosevelt put it more eloquently, in envisioning "an
awakening sense of responsibility for [our] brothers[:] ... if we hope to
see the preservation of our civilization, if we believe that there is any210. Panjabi, supra note 48, at 193.
211. The guidelines may be seen as later, more developed articulations of the objectives set
forth in the Second Session Report, supra note 49, the general observations regarding the submission of reports set forth in the FirstSession Report, supra note 49, at 48- 49, and the suggestions and recommendations adopted in id. at 51-53. The Committee's continual efforts to
improve, clarify, and make the country reports more useful is a constant theme running
throughout the Session reports. At the same time, rigor must be tempered with tact and diplomacy so as to avoid alienating the parties. Tikhonov Interview, supra note 21.
212. Its efforts to clarify the language of Article 2(l), for example, demonstrate the Committee's determination to put teeth into the Covenant. See Fifth Session Report,supra note 49.
While it might be argued that it is precisely the slow, incremental creation of norms that
assures their validity, here the response must be terse: There is not time. As Edward Sparer
reminded us, "[t]oo many people [are] too poor." Sparer, supra note 137, at 540. See also
Tolley, supra note 150, at 582-85 (comparing strategies of U.S, interest groups with those of
international human rights organizations).
213. "States have much to learn in this reporting process, both from comments by members of the council and from the reports of other countries." Third Session Report, supra note
49 (quoting Australian representative).
214. Second Session Report, supra note 49, at 26. As Brian Barry has observed, "[T]here is
a virtuous circle in which the existence of redistributive institutions and beliefs in the legitimacy of redistribution are mutually reinforcing and have a strong tendency to become more
extensive together over time." Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 209, at 219, 240. See also THOMAS M.
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990) (describing how "a rule
or rule-making institution . . . itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed
normatively").
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thing worthy of perpetuation in what we have built thus far, then our
people must turn to brotherly love, not as a doctrine but as a way of
2 15
living."

215. A.E. ROOSEVELT, THIS TROUBLED WORLD 45-46 (1938). This is an enduring
message, as we were reminded during the Los Angeles riots: "[W]hat, as a nation, did we
really expect? The residents of our inner cities have for many years now been unable to lay
claim to our national sense of common humanity and simple decency. On what basis can we
expect to suddenly lay claim to theirs?" The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, May 11, 1992,
at 27.

